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NOTES
THE LEGAL SETTING OF NUCLEAR POWERPLANT
SITING DECISIONS: A NEW YORK STATE
CONTROVERSY*
Throughout the country public groups have begun to reexamine
the adequacy of institutions that allow private parties to act without
due regard for possible environmental consequences of their actions.1
One example is the citizens' group challenge to the New York State
Electric and Gas Corporation's decision in 1967 to build a nuclear
powerplant on Cayuga Lake. The group was concerned with the effect
of the powerplant's heated effluent on the lake.2 What follows is an anal-
ysis of the institutional controls that existed in 1967 for coping with
such private decisions and the subsequent changes in those controls
brought about by public reaction to the system's apparent inadequacies.
* This note was written with the support of the Cornell Program on Science,
Technology, and Society, the National Science Foundation, and the Duke University
School of Law, Committee on Legal Issues in Health Care.
I Public controversies over the Alaska pipeline, supersonic transport, and Hilton
Head Island are just a few of many instances of public reexamination of environmental
controls. Notable cases include Zabel v. Tabb, 480 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 910 (1971); New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
962 (1969); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). See also P. EmujiCH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968);
HousE COMM. ON SCIENCE & ASTRONAUTICS, 91sT CONG. IST SEss., A STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING COMMsIITTEE ON PUBLIC
ENGINEERING POLICY (Comm. Print 1969); HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE & ASTRONAUTICS, 91St
CONG., IST SESS., TECHNOLOGY-PROCESSES OF ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE: REPORT OF THE NAT'L
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (Comm. Print 1969); SIERRA CLUB, ECOTACTICS: SIERRA CLUB HANDsOOK
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISTS (1970).
2 This controversy has been recorded in detail in D. NELEIN, NUCLEAR POWER AND ITS
CRITICS: THE CAYUGA LAKE CONTROVERSY (1971) [hereinafter cited as NELKIN].
Thermal pollution is an issue of increasing public concern:
[L]arge power plants with enormous cooling water requirements are becoming
commonplace. The Federal Power Commission reports that 59 new fossil-fueled
plants . . . were scheduled to go into service in the period 1967 to 1973. An
additional 41 nuclear plants . . . were also scheduled to go into service in the
same period.
The cooling water discharges . . . will make a substantial addition to the
waste heat discharged to our Nation's streams. It warrants a prompt and
concerted effort to establish effective means of control. By 1980 the electric power
industry will require about one-sixth of the total available fresh water runoff in
the entire Nation for cooling purposes.
OFFICE oF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, CONSDERATIONs AFFECTING STEAM POWER PLANT SITE
SELECTION 39 (1968) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as OST REPORT].
POWERPLANT SITING DECISIONS
I
THE BELL STATION DECISION
New York State Electric and Gas Corporation (NYSE&G) was in-
corporated as the Ithaca Gas Company in 1852.8 Through mergers
with approximately 200 other local utilities and annexation of new
franchise areas, the company grew to its present size, servicing thirty-
five percent of New York's land area. Operating within a system of
state regulation requiring utilities to provide ample power at the low-
est reasonable rates,4 NYSE&G, like any other private industry, makes
decisions based primarily on economic factors. 5
A. The Decision To Expand
Electric power loads in the United States have increased at an
average annual rate of seven percent over the last thirty years, with
the consumption of power doubling each decade. 6 Claiming that exist-
ing generating capacity would be insufficient by 1973, 7 NYSE&G an-
nounced in March 1967 that it was considering development of new
facilities;8 past experience had indicated that the construction of a
modem powerplant required a lead time of up to six or seven years.
There are few remaining sources of hydroelectric power in the
United States.9 The two methods of electrical generation available to
utilities are fossil fueled ° and nuclear powered steam generators.",
Economies of scale are best achieved through nuclear power.12 As some
3 See NELIUN 26 for the history and present structure of NYSE&G.
4 N.Y. Pun. SERv. LAW § 65(1) (McKinney 1955).
5 See, e.g., Statement by William A. Lyons, President, New York State Electric and
Gas Corporation, Board of Directors Meeting, April 11, 1969 (on file at the Cornell Law
Review). "The economic factor," Lyons said, "was the basis of the [Bell Station] decision
as it must inevitably be in advance planning for meeting our legally-mandated responsi-
bility to provide ample power at the lowest reasonable rates anticipated for the time the
power will become available." Id. See also In re City Ice & Fuel Co., 260 App. Div. 537,
542, 23 N.Y.S.2d 376, 381 (3d Dep't 1940).
6 NEncmr 5.
7 NYSE&G officials had at another time also indicated a 1976 date. NELKIN 31.
8 NYSE&G, Press Release, March 7, 1967 (on file at the Cornell Law Review). See
N.Y. State Joint Legislative Comm. on Conservation, Natural Resources, and Scenic
Beauty, Hearings, Nov. 22, 1968, in 1 Tim CAYuGA LAKE HANBOOK 134 (1969) (statement of
W. P. Allen, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
9 Gehr, Public Utilities-Problems of Electric Power Generation; Coal Versus Oil;
Local Regulation of the Sulphur Content of Fuels; Thermonuclear Power; The Problem
of "Thermo" Pollution, 3 NATURAL RasouacEs LAw. 103, 106 (1970).
10 I.e., fueled by coal or natural gas.
11 For discussion of various methods of power generation, see A.B. CAMBEL, ENERGY
R&D AND NATxoNAL PROGRP S (1964).
12 OST REPORT 3.
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experts have indicated, "nuclear reactors now appear to be the cheap-
est of all sources of energy. . . . [N]uclear energy will become cheap
enough to influence drastically the many industrial processes that use
energy."' 3 This confidence in the potential of nuclear reactors, rein-
forced by concern about air pollution from fossil fueled plants, 14 ap-
pears to be industry wide, for "in 1968 about 40 percent of all new
steam power capacity ordered was for nuclear plants."'15 NYSEgCG,
therefore, decided to construct a nuclear generator.
All cost and environmental analyses leading to the decision to
build a nuclear powerplant were made solely within the corporate
structure of the utility. No societal controls came into play at this
stage.
16
B. Selection of a Site
Nuclear power generation requires large quantities of water to dis-
sipate the waste heat. Availability of a year-round cold water supply
was a vital consideration in the selection of Cayuga Lake as the site
for the proposed powerplant, which was to be known as Bell Station.17
This siting choice was based on the most economical way to dispose
of waste heat. The company, however, was not completely unconcerned
about the plant's effect on the lake. Knowing that a nuclear plant gen-
erates greater heat than a fossil fueled plant, the utility undertook its
own preliminary analysis of the possible effects of heat discharge into
Cayuga Lake. Its study indicated that a nuclear plant with a once-
through cooling system would probably raise the average temperature
of the lake only one degree Fahrenheit, which the company considered
negligible in comparison to the damage caused each year by agricul-
tural runoff and urban sewage."" If further studies indicated adverse
effects, the company anticipated that those effects could be neutralized
by changes in plant design.
18 Weinberg & Young, The Nuclear Energy Revolution, 1966, 57 PFoo. NAT'. ACAD.
Sci. 1 (1967).
14 In one respect the electric utility industry was very fortunate. At about the time
that the interest in clean air and clean water was getting started, along came
nuclear power, which has been demonstrated to be a feasible and economic
method of generating electricity. One of the principal advantages in a nuclear
power plant is that it provides an economical means of generating electricity with
practically no air pollution.
Gehr, supra note 9, at 109. See also Hearings 134 (statement of W.P. Allen, Jr.).
15 OST REPoRT 4.
16 "[Plant site] investigations are presently the initial responsibility of the individual
utilities in the various segments of the electric power industry." OST REPoar vii.
17 Id. at 22. See Hearings 135 (statement of A.D. Tuttle).
18 Hearings 148 (statement of S.A. Lyon).
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The peculiar size and temperature pattern of Cayuga Lake,19 per-
mitting year-round access to water at a temperature of approximately
forty-five degrees, made it ideal for the economical once-through
cooling system. Canals connecting Cayuga Lake with major waterways
would permit shipment of the reactor vessel by water, the most eco-
nomical means of transportation. The plant was in the approximate
center of NYSE&cG's area of operations and precisely half way between
the two major extra high voltage lines of the New York State Power
Authority.2 0 Finally, Milliken Station, a fossil fueled plant located on an
adjacent land tract, would be an ideal thermal backup for the nuclear
plant.
C. Public Response
Responses of those affected by the decision varied. Most immedi-
ately affected were lakefront property owners, who were notified that
their land was condemned. None chose to oppose the right of the com-
pany to condemn the land, however. The Tompkins County Board
of Supervisors and the Chamber of Commerce applauded the siting
decision, honoring the utility as "Company of the Year."2' The deci-
sion was also welcomed by the Ithaca Taxpayers Association as an
economic boon to the area.22 Bell Station was to employ about 600
people during the construction phase and about sixty on a permanent
basis. The local Building Trades Council was impressed with the es-
timated construction payroll of $25 million.23 Bell Station was also
expected to contribute significantly to the tax base of the nearby town
of Lansing. 24
19 For a discussion of the lake's physical characteristics see note 30 infra. See also
E. HENSON, A. BRADsHAW & D. CHANDLER, THE PHYSicAL LIMNOLOGY OF CAYUGA LAKE, NEW
YoRK (1961).
20 Thus a plant on the lake could transmit power conveniently to either line and
feed into the exchange system of the New York State Power Pool. Since the new
plant would make available more capacity than needed by present NYSE&G
customers, the plan was to tie in to the New York State transmission system and
sell about 70 per cent of the new capacity the first year.
NELKIN 33-34 (footnote omitted).
21 Id. at 34.
22 Id. at 68.
23 Id. at 63.
24 [A]ccording to a recent Lansing Planning Board survey, the present full value
tax base [of the town of Lansing] of about $65.5 million could increase to be-
tween $250 million and $280 million by 1974, if Bell Station were to be built.
Although not all tax revenue would go to the town of Lansing, the increased
tax base was expected to lower the tax rate.
Id. at 34-35 (footnote omitted).
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Several Cornell University conservationists 25 who learned that the
heated effluent of the plant would be discharged directly into Cayuga
Lake first raised the threat of thermal pollution.2 6 Their efforts led
to the formation of a citizens' group, the Citizens Committee to Save
Cayuga Lake (CSCL).27 Conservation groups, sporting clubs, and home-
owner associations throughout the region associated themselves with
CSCL, which became a center of environmental activity and the main
focus of opposition to the NYSEg:G plans.
CSCL did not oppose nuclear power; rather its major criticism
was directed towards Bell Station's planned design, which was felt to
afford inadequate environmental protection. As it attempted to have
its views considered, CSCL soon discovered the inadequacy of existing
institutions to protect natural resources.28
II
THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY
Bell Station would circulate about 1225 cubic feet of cooling water
per second, discharging heated water on the surface of the lake.2 9 The
cooling water, pumped into the reactor from the lowest levels of the
lake at a temperature of about forty-five degrees, would later be dis-
25 See Eipper, Nuclear Power on Cayuga Lake, in PATIENT ERT 112 (J. Harte &
R. Socolow eds. 1971).
26 The details of the station were publicized early in 1968 at workshops sponsored by
the Cayuga Lake Basin Regional Water Resources Planning Board (CLBB):
The CLBB consists of nonpaid members nominated by the Tompkins County
Board of Supervisors and appointed by the State Water Resources Commission.
The Board exists under state conservation law to develop a comprehensive water
management plan for the region, which it submits to the Water Resources Com-
mission .... It is the only mechanism for intergovernmental cooperation in the
lake basin area, and its activities are limited to planning.
NELKiN 36. The CLBB has no legal authority over private decisions affecting the basin.
2 The organization's official purpose was "[t]o inform the citizens of the Cayuga
Lake region about actual and potential sources of bacterial, chemical, thermal and
radioactive pollution of the lake, and to coordinate efforts [of all concerned organiza-
tions and individuals] to prevent and eradicate any pollution endangering the foremost
natural resource of the region." 1 THE CAYUGA LAKE HANDBOOK 102 (CSCL 1969) [herein-
after cited as HANDBOOK]. This handbook provides a complete background of CSCL's
activities.
28 [We] contend that the existing political system of granting permits to a
utility company to site a nuclear-fueled power plant on Lake Cayuga, allowing
it to take the lake's cold water for use and to return it heated .... is not
adequate.
Hearings 93 (statement of L. Hamilton).
29 See NELKIN 24 for further discussion of the reactor and its effects on the lake.
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charged on the surface at about sixty-five degrees. CSCL feared that
as the lake's normal stratification pattern 0 was disrupted through this
pumping activity the natural eutrophication process would be accel-
erated.31 Biological production, which may eventually cause a lake to
choke with algae and weed growth, would be stimulated in two ways.
The continual addition of heated water would delay the cooling and
mixing of the lake in the winter, extending the biological growing
season. Moreover, pumping would further increase the lake's fertility
by drawing the available nutrients from the lowest level of the lake
and discharging them into the warmer waters at the surface.
Several scientific and engineering studies were undertaken under
NYSE9-.G contract in an attempt to clarify the physical effects of the
powerplant. 32 One report concluded that the thermal discharge of the
proposed station would cause an overall increase in lake surface tem-
perature of less than ten percent of the normal fluctuation. The
mechanical transfer of cooling water from the lake's lowest level would
lengthen the stratification period by four to five days at each end, an
extension not radically different from that caused by the natural fluc-
tuation. A research group at Cornell estimated that at the time of the
greatest thermal effect, algae might increase by five percent. Neither
the increase in temperature, the decrease in oxygen in the hypolim-
nion,33 nor the longer stratification season, the researchers said, would
have significant effect on the lake as a whole.34 But the group's report
included the following caveat: "Limnologists know so little about the
ecological significance of some of these environmental parameters that
30 Deep cold water lakes, such as Cayuga, tend to become stratified during the
warmer months:
Cayuga Lake has an annual thermal cycle consisting essentially of two stratification
periods. From about the first week in May to the first week in December ... the
lake is stratified into three areas: the epilimnion or surface layer, the hypo-
limnion or deepest and coldest layer, and the metalimnion or intermediate
layer. . . . During the second period, from December to May, the lake is
isothermal. As the lake loses heat in the winter and temperature differences
between the levels decrease, mixing occurs and the lake reaches a uniform tem-
perature of about 350-40° F. Again, in the spring, as heat is gained at the surface,
it is vertically diffused; but temperature changes decrease with the depth of the
water. The hypolimnion is never warmed above about 45° F.
NELKw 22-23 (footnote omitted).
31 Eutrophication is the process by which a lake ages owing to increasing biological
activity. It normally occurs when nutrients such as nitrates and phosphates drain into
lakes from the surrounding watershed and increase lake fertility. Id. at 41-42.
32 Id. at 38, 52.
33 Note 30 supra.
34 WATER R-souRcEs & MARiNE SCIENCEs CENTER, ECOLOGY OF CAYUGA LAKE AND THE
PRoPosED BELL STATION 451 (R. Oglesby & D. Allee eds. 1969).
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predictions of biological effects would be highly conjectural even if
exact descriptions of the physical changes were available." 85
In the case of Cayuga Lake there is little information by which
to evaluate the effect of prolonged, if seemingly minor, disruptions of
normal stratification and eutrophication. No adequate theory is avail-
able to explain the mechanisms that maintain the lake's stratification
pattern and the system of nutrient and heat exchange. Nor are the
stresses that would occur at the interface between the heated plume86
and the underlying body of water well understood. The effect of a
pumping unit on the turbulence structure of the lake, therefore, must
remain largely a matter of educated speculation. In addition, causes
of alterations in the nutrient content of the lake are difficult to isolate
in view of the total residential and agricultural situation in the lake
drainage area. 7
Conservationists noted that the temperature changes caused by
the powerplant, even if within the range of normal fluctuation, would
nonetheless consistently increase the lake's biological productivity.
There was considerable concern about whether the damage caused
by this process could be reversed.38 CSCL took the position that the
company should take maximum protective measures, including con-
struction of alternative cooling systems. One of the methods proposed
85 Id. at 452. The report continued:
The importance of considering extremes as well as averages, the naturally great
temporal and spatial variability of biological systems, the size of the lake being
studied, the short duration of the present investigation, and the incompleteness
and/or unreliability of those investigations conducted previously are all factors
adding to the difficulty of drawing readily quantifiable conclusions.
Id. at 450.
86 I.e., the path of the effluent released into the lake.
87 [Tjhere are about 182 locations around Cayuga Lake that are classified as
polluted for human bathing. Many lakes-shore cottages dump wastes directly
into the lake, and an estimated 2,500 people in the drainage basin live in non-
sewered municipal areas. The agricultural and dairy industries bordering the lake
release about 725,000 tons of animal waste and 83,000 tons of fertilizer to the
soil annually.
NE.xN 94.
8 The question of irreversibility is fundamental to [nuclear plant siting contro-
versies] and one difficult to resolve. A member of the [Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration] noted four ways to prevent eutrophication, the first
being the most important: (1) limiting fertility of waters, (2) utilizing food chains
to improve lakes, (8) stimulating parasites to kill off aquatic plants, and (4) using
toxic chemicals to kill algae.
4 ENVIRONMENTAL Sc. & TECH. 270 (1970).
Some experiments suggest that technically at least, eutrophication may be reversible.
In one well known situation, "the diversion of sewage away from Lake Washington in
Seattle effectively reduced algal growth." NELKIN 95-96. Tests recently conducted at Cor-
nell on experimental ponds suggest that if fertilization of a lake were to cease, eutrophica-
tion could be reversed.
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involved a natural draft cooling system in which discharged water
would be pumped into large, hyperbolic towers, cooled by contact with
air, and recirculated. 9 The estimated cost would be $21.3 million in
initial investment and an additional $2.4 million in annual operating
cost.40 In the context of these costs and of inconclusive technical evi-
dence as to the extent of possible damage, preconstruction regulation
and control became increasingly important.
III
REGULATION OF PRIVATE WATER USE
A. Private Controls-New York 1967
1. Injunctive Actions
The doctrine of riparian rights,4 1 developed in part to curb water
pollution, is illustrated by the New York case of Strobel v. Kerr Salt
Co.,42 in which fourteen downstream mill owners sought to restrain a
salt company from polluting Oatka Creek. Although salt was the lead-
ing industry of Oatka Valley and the method of salt mining used was
the only profitable one, the court issued an injunction, stating:
When the... pollution ... is caused by a new and extraordinary
method of using the water, hitherto unknown in the state, and
such method... renders [it] so salt [sic], at times, that cattle will
not drink it unless forced to by necessity, fish are destroyed in great
numbers, vegetation is killed and machinery rusted, such use as a
39 Cooling towers may be required if water quantities, flows, or temperature are
not satisfactory for meeting approved thermal water quality standards for
present or future generating units. They require considerably more space and
capital cost than conventional once-through condenser cooling installations.
Mechanical draft towers require somewhat more land area than do the natural
draft type.
OST REPORT 16. See NERIN 85.
40 NELuu 85. Cooling towers, however, may cause their own environmental prob-
lems, including aesthetic annoyance, local rain during otherwise dry periods, and occa-
sional mist and fog. OST REPORT 16.
41 A riparian owner is entitled to a reasonable use of the water flowing by his
premises in a natural stream, as an incident to his ownership of the soil, and to
have it transmitted to him without sensible alteration in quality or unreasonable
diminution in quantity. While he does not own the running water, he has the
right to a reasonable use of it as it passes by his land. As all other owners upon
the same stream have the same right, the right of no one is absolute, but is
qualified by the right of the others to have the stream substantially preserved in
its natural size, flow and purity, and to protection against material diversion or
pollution.
Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 803, 320, 58 N.E. 142, 147 (1900).
42 164 N.Y. 803, 58 N.E. 142 (1900).
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matter of law is unreasonable and entitles the lower riparian owner
to relief.
43
The Strobel injunction indicates that one method of controlling
water use was for the court to enjoin any major violation of riparian
rights. This right to an injunction, regardless of the disparity in in-
juries between plaintiff and defendant, was reiterated in Whalen v.
Union Bag & Paper Co.44 In that case the court permitted a riparian
landowner with damages amounting to $100 a year to obtain an injunc-
tion against a polluting paper mill despite the mill's total investment
capital of one million dollars and payroll of 400 to 500 workers. To do
otherwise, according to the court, would "deprive the poor litigant of his
little property by giving it to those already rich. . . . [D]enying the
injunction puts the hardship on the party in whose favor the legal
right exists instead of on the wrongdoer.
'45
Today these decisions might be viewed as attempts by the court
to protect the environment. But as water rights doctrines were closely
related to agrarian economy, it is more likely that these decisions were
designed to preserve agricultural industry.
46
Had such an injunction been available to CSCL it would have
been a useful bargaining tool in persuading NYSEgcG either to consider
more fully thermal pollution in its initial siting and design decisions
or to accept the idea of cooling towers. By 1967, however, despite pre-
viously clear judicial power and generally strict legal controls on in-
dustry,47 New York was retreating from its once strong judicial posi-
tion on private water pollution.
New York in 1966 enacted a statute changing common law ripar-
ian rules by redefining reasonable use of water in terms of harm or
threat of harm.48 The new law permitted the courts to intervene only
43 Id. at 321, 58 N.E. at 147.
44 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
45 Id. at 5, 101 N.E. at 806.
46 The relevance of agrarian water law decisions to the pollution problems of 1971
is questionable. See Ohrenscholl & Imhoff, Water Law's Double Environment: How Water
Law Doctrines Impede the Attainment of Environmental Enhancement Goals, 5 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 259 (1970). See also, Comment, Water Pollution Control in New York, 31
ALBANY L. REv. 50 (1967).
47 E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See
Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966);
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1964); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
48 N.Y. CoNsERv. LAw § 4290) (McKinney 1967). Pertinent portions of the law read
as follows:
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in those cases where the new use of water interfered with a prior land
use or the current market value of property. Such restrictions obviously
leave substantial areas of protection for industrial polluters, particu-
larly in cases where the effects of pollution are not yet fully understood.
Even when some form of damage becomes imminent the injured party
-not the user of the water-must bear the burden of proof.49 The
problem becomes more acute if the effects of thermal pollution are
irreversible, in which case all legal remedies will be too late. In this
legal context, there would be little threat of an injunction to influence
the NYSE&G siting and design decisions.
Even if damages caused by thermal pollution become so highly
predictable that a complaining party could bear his burden of proof
under New York law, the courts might still refuse to grant an injunc-
tion in view of the necessity for an adequate electrical supply and, in
some instances, the tremendous costs involved in closing down an op-
erating plant. Such considerations might induce the courts to apply
the doctrine of inverse condemnation, awarding compensation to the
injured parties but permitting the plant to continue operation.50
2. Condemnation Contests
Normally private industry does not have powers of condemna-
tion.5' Utilities, however, commonly possess a statutory delegation of
such power.5 2 Even were the courts to find that Bell Station's thermal
(1) An alteration... in the natural flow, quantity, quality or condition of a ...
lake... effected by the use . . . of the water . . . or by the addition of water
thereto, or by changes in . . . other physical characteristics . . . is reasonable
and lawful . .. unless such alteration is causing harm . . . or would cause ...
immediate harm if and when begun....
(2) . . . "[H]arm" shall mean (a) interference with a present use of the
water . . . or an interference with the complaining party's present enjoyment
of riparian land occurring prior to suit, or which will immediately occur when
the alteration... is begun ... or (b) a decrease in the market value ....
49 Id. § 4290)(2)(b).
50 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E2d 870, 809 N.Y.S2d
312 (1970).
51 The power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty. United States v.
Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 286 (1946); Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924);
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); Application of Mazzone, 281 N.Y. 139, 146,
22 N.E.2d 815, 318 (1989). It rests upon political necessity and is subject only to the
constitutional due process limitation that the taking must be for a public use. People v.
Adirondack R.R., 160 N.Y. 225, 288, 54 N.E. 689, 693, aft'd, 176 US. 885 (1900).
Although the power of the sovereign may be delegated (Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S.
403, 406 (1878); People ex rel. Horton v. Prendergast, 248 N.Y. 215, 224, 162 N.E. 10, 12
(1928)), such delegation is strictly construed (Society of N.Y. Hosp. v. Johnson, 5 N.Y.2d
102, 107, 154 N.E.2d 550, 552, 180 N.Y..2d 287, 291 (1958)). See also Note, Eminent Domain
and the Environment, 56 CoRN.LL I. R~v. 651 (1971).
52 E.g., N.Y. Ta~sp. CoRP. LAw § 11(3)(a) (McKinney Supp, 1971). See note 51 supra.
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effluent would destroy some water rights, NYSE&G's exercise of its con-
demnation power to acquire a site could not be attacked so long as
it was legally authorized. 53 Only if the condemnee could establish that
the company was not so authorized could the company be prevented
from taking such action.
Some New York cases, however, have taken a strict view of non-
government entities exercising the power of eminent domain. For ex-
ample, in Bradley v. Degnon Contracting Co.54 the Court of Appeals
struck down the use of the condemnation power by a private corpora-
tion acting "under and in accordance with the authority of a statute
relating to the construction of [a] subway." 55 The company had built
a tramway on a public street to haul away construction debris. Adja-
cent landowners brought suit to restrain the operation of the tramway.
The court refused to recognize the authority of the corporation to use
the street even though it found that the operation of the tramway was
reasonable and non-negligent. "[P]ublic highways and streets are ...
held by the state in trust for the use of all the people .... The legis-
lature, as the representative of the state, has control and authority over
them . . . ."56 The court stated that the construction of the tramway
"was a specific appropriation and taking of private property, incident
to but not consequent upon ... the construction of the subway." 57
Bell Station's discharge of heated water on Cayuga Lake presents
a parallel issue. In the same way a public street is held in trust, Cayuga
Lake is held by the state for public use.A8 And just as the use of a
particular street may be unnecessary for removal of construction waste,
the use of the water of the lake for waste heat removal is not essential
to provide electrical energy. Alternative methods for waste disposal
exist in each case. As long as alternatives exist, the case is one of un-
necessary private use of a valuable public resource.
If the NYSE8&G condemnation exercise had been challenged in
1967, however, the uncertainties would probably have weighed against
the plaintiff,59 even though conservation groups had at that time begun
53 "The only theory upon which the Legislature can delegate to [a power company]
the right to take private property is founded upon the right of the general public to use
the heat, light or power generated by [it]." People ex rel. Horton v. Prendergast, 248
N.Y. 215, 225, 162 N.E. 10, 12 (1928).
54 224 N.Y. 60, 120 N.E. 89 (1918).
55 Id. at 65, 120 N.E. at 90.
56 Id. at 67, 120 N.E. at 91.
57 Id. at 70, 120 N.E. at 92.
58 Title to and sovereign power over a large and important body of water is in the
state. This power is held in trust for the people. For dictum on Cayuga Lake, see
Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, 142 N.E. 437 (1923).
59 Although legislative decisions granting the use of condemnation power are not
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to argue that the user of a natural resource should bear the burden of
proving that such use would not endanger the environment. 60 If the
courts permitted a shifting of the burden in every situation where
there is substantial uncertainty, as in the case of Cayuga Lake, the
effect might be to hamper severely programs of development. In addi-
tion, the 1966 law restricting the applicability of the old riparian rights
doctrine8' seemed to indicate that the state's policy at that time was to
strengthen the position of industry.
The foregoing analysis indicates why in 1967 parties wishing to
contest the Bell Station decision could not rely on private remedies.
Perhaps the most effective method of enforcing private rights, the in-
junction, was for the most part unavailable without protracted and
expensive litigation. Even if it had been readily available the outcome
would have been highly uncertain since the complaining party had the
burden of proof. Consequently public rather than private remedies
seemed the best recourse.
B. State Controls-1967
1. ElectricityM2
Recognition of the special status of electric companies as public
service corporations has a long history in New York.63 Today the semi-
public status of NYSE&G brings with it several privileges unavailable
to private business. One is the power of eminent domain which allows
utilities to acquire real estate deemed necessary to maintain an ade-
quate supply of electricity. Another is the right to acquire easements
a conclusive influence on the courts, "they are entitled at least to great respect, since
they relate to public conditions concerning which the Legislature both by necessity and
duty must have known." New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 339,
1 N.E.2d 153, 154 (1936). These legislative findings will be accepted by the court unless
it is shown that the use is dearly private. Bronx Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Fullen,
174 Misc. 524, 529, 21 N.Y.S.2d 474, 481 (Sup. Ct. 1940). "Mhe condemnee has the burden
of demonstrating to the satisfaction of the court that the taking is arbitrary. A showing
that there exists a viable alternative to the taking will not suffice." Note, supra note 51, at
654 (footnote omitted).
60 For an unsuccessful attempt to place the burden on a condemnor, see Texas E.
Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966). See also
McCarter, The Case That Almost Was, 54 A.BAJ. 1076 (1968); Note, supra note 51.
Cf. Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 587,
616-20 (1969).
61 N.Y. CoNsanv. LAw § 429(j) (McKinney 1967).
62 New York statutes regulating the powers and duties of electric companies are com-
piled in N.Y. TRANsP. CoRP. LAw § 11 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
6s N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 2(13) (McKinney 1955). Public service commissions which
regulate such corporations were established in New York by the Act of June 6, 1907,
ch. 429, [1907] N.Y. Laws 889.
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and rights of way for transmission facilities." Moreover, only those
business corporations organized under the specified sections of the trans-
portation law are permitted to enter into contracts to supply electri-
city,65 thereby giving duly organized electric corporations a monopoly.
NYSE&G is under state regulation through the Public Service
Commission (PSC).66 In 1967, however, the PSC had no direct control
over the environmental effects of utility decisions. Its major influence
came through its enforcement of the requirement that utilities con-
tinue to provide electricity at the lowest reasonable cost. This require-
ment may have discouraged environmental concern, since mandatory
cost control may create a bias when a utility is faced with choosing be-
tween alternatives in plant design. For nuclear plants the most inex-
pensive method of disposing of waste heat is the once-through cooling
system. This became the central dispute in the Cayuga Lake contro-
versy.
2. Water
The New York legislature began to provide statutory controls on
water use as early as 1880, when it empowered the governor to declare
a public nuisance upon recommendation from the Board of Health.
7
Legislation aimed specifically at water pollution was enacted as early
as 1906.68 Comprehensive agency regulated programs were not insti-
tuted until 1949, however, with the establishment of the Water Pollu-
tion Control Board.6 9
04 N.Y. TRNsp. CoRP. LAw § 11(3-a) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
65 8284 Corp. v. Carey, 137 Misc. 197, 198, 242 N.Y.S. 41%k 414 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1930).
66 N.Y. PuB. Stav. LAw § 64 (McKinney 1955). Electric companies may ndt refuse
service to any consumer within a reasonable distance of appropriate power lines, and
service must be provided at a reasonable price. Id. Electric companies in New York have
private management and compete for new franchise areas by negotiating with municipali-
ties.
[T]he law leaves the utility [furnishing gas or electricity], as it was at common
law, free to extend its facilities and to afford inducements to encourage its business
and to foster its interests on the same principles which are followed in other
pursuits and trades.
In re City Ice & Fuel Co., 260 App. Div. 537, 542, 23 N.Y.S2d 376, 381 (3d Dep't 1940). A
utility is usually awarded an exclusive franchise to supply a particular community's
power. Its obligations are largely contractual, and if a company defaults it may lose the
privilege of serving an area. Within a franchise area, the PSC may order the utility to
service new electricity needs, but it cannot require a utility without compensation to
make large expenditures for extensions into a new territory. New York ex rel. Woodhaven
Gas & Light Co. v. P$C, 269 U.S. 244, 248 (1925).
67 Murray, Historical Development of the Public Health Law, in N.Y. Put. HA.. TH
LAw xxv, xxvii (McKinney 1954).
68 Act of May 25, 1906, ch. 689, [1906] N.Y. Laws 1646.
69 The Board was established by the Act of April 20, 1949, ch. 666, § 105, [1949]
N.Y. Laws 1512. Its purpose was to prevent and abate pollution of state waters. In 1961
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By 1967, New York had developed various means of controlling
private decisions affecting state waters.70 The Water Resources Com-
mission (WRC) in the Department of Conservation supervised the law
most directly relevant to the proposed Bell Station.71 Under this law
the WRC classified state waters and developed standards of water qual-
ity and purity.72 Temperature standards prohibited heat additions
which injured fish life or made the water unsuitable for its best usage.
Contravention of these standards could subject the violator to both
civil and criminal liability; the liability, however, was enforceable
only by the state.73 Cayuga Lake was classified in part in the highest
use category.74
Most pertinent to Bell Station was the requirement that no new
effluent outlets discharging industrial wastes could become operational
without a permit from the Health Department.7 5 A permit requires
departmental approval of the applicant's plans and assurance that the
new discharge will be neither in contravention of the WRC standards
nor "injurious to public health and public enjoyment [of the water],
the propagation and protection of fish and wild life, and the industrial
development of the state."
76
This would be the first point in the private decision-making pro-
cess at which NYSEgcG would actually have to make a public account-
ing of the potential environmental effects of its decision. Nevertheless
this control would not be activated until a plant was already con-
structed and ready to become an operational discharger. Also, since
the Health Department is charged with developing standards compat-
ible with industrial development,77 it might be reluctant to refuse such
a permit.
the legislature abolished the Board and replaced it with what became the Water Re-
sources Commission. Law of April 12, 1961, ch. 490, [1961] N.Y. Laws 1639. The WRC
has since been abolished. See note 71 infra.
70 Each approach was contained in a separate article of the Public Health Law. N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAw arts. 11, 12, 13 (McKinney 1954)..AIl were derived from the Public
Health Law of 1909 (Act of Feb. 17, 1909, ch. 49, [1909] N.Y. Laws 3013), which itself
was derived in part from earlier enactments. See Murray, supra note 67, at xxvii-xxix.
71 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1205 (McKinney 1971). The WRC has since had its
functions transferred to the Department of Environmental Conservation. N.Y. EviRON-
MbENTAL CoNsE v. LAW §§ 75-76 (McKinney 1970).
72 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1205 (McKinney 1971).
73 Id. §§ 1250-52.
74 Portions of the lake are classified as a "[s]ource of water supply for drinking,
culinary or food processing purposes and any other usages." 6(E) N.Y. CODES, RULES &
REGULATIONS § 898.4 (items 226-28) (1967). But see id. (item 225).
75 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 1230 (McKinney 1971).
76 Id. § 1230(4)(b).
17 The law requires the standards to be drawn "with a view to ... encouraging the
most appropriate use of lands bordering said waters, for ... industrial [among other] ...
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Milliken Station's discharge had not violated state standards, and
the Department of Health presumed that upon its completion Bell
Station would also satisfy them.78 Moreover, the enforcement measures
available to the state were strictly post facto, requiring first a public
hearing and an agency finding that the standards or permits had been
violated. 79 Thus enforcement measures would be ineffective in the
Cayuga Lake case, for by the time fish kills were evident, the lake
could be irreversibly harmed.80
Another public control is administered by the state Health De-
partment.8' The department is authorized to promulgate and enforce
rules and regulations for protection of potable water supplies.8 2 This
control is available only after an investigation discloses a violation.
8 3
Absent a definition of waste heat as "contamination" potentially in-
jurious to the public health, however, this remedy would be of little
utility in the Cayuga Lake case.84
Despite the apparent variety of state remedies, legislative water
pollution programs are rivaled in their ineffectiveness only by existing
private remedies.88 Failure of various agencies with limited jurisdic-
purposes ...." Id. § 1205(3)(b). This responsibility weighed heavily on the Department
of Health:
The State Health Department looks on Cayuga Lake as a valuable asset to the
state and, therefore, is interested in protecting it. On the other side of the coin,
the State Health Department is involved with the industrial development of the
state.
HANDBOOK 126 (letter from D.F. Metzler, Deputy Commissioner, N.Y. Dep't of Health, to
W.B. Ward, Aug. 28, 1968).
[]easonable use of the waters of the State must be allowed in order to encourage
industrial development.... The prohibition of any discharges ... would be an
unreasonable measure to protect the environment when weighed against the
detrimental effect on industrial development.
Id. at 127 (letter from R.S. Bratspis, N.Y. Environmental Health Services, to Mrs.
J.H. Lehman, Oct. 17, 1968).
78 "If the company is proceeding to construct then they must be confident that they
can meet any requirements we may impose with reference to protecting the environment."
Id. at 126 (letter from D.F. Metzler, Deputy Commissioner, N.Y. Dep't of Health, to
W.B. Ward, Aug. 28, 1968).
79 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1240-42 (McKinney 1971).
80 Seo note 88 and accompanying text supra.
81 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 1100-08 (McKinney 1971).
82 Id. §§ 1100-03.
83 Id. §§ 1102, 1156, 1157(3)(a), 1163, 1165.
84 In Driscoll v. American Hide & Leather Co., 102 Misc. 612, 170 N.Y.S. 121 (Sup.
Ct. 1918), landowners relying on this statutory protection sought to restrain a village
disposal plant from polluting their stream. The court denied the injunction. There was
a conflict between expert and lay opinions as to the extent of pollution, and the court
assumed that the consequences of an injunction would amount to a public calamity.
This case is strikingly similar to the Cayuga Lake case and indicates the limitations of
this public remedy.
85 Comment, supranote 46, at 59-60 (1967).
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ton to cooperate in the administration of the programs contributes
to this ineffectiveness. In this context, the initial Bell Station decision
was largely as free of mandatory legislative constraint concerning dis-
posal of thermal wastes as it had been free of the threat of private
injunctive action.
C. Federal Controls-1967
The history of federal activity in utility and water pollution is-
sues is marked chiefly by nonintervention. 8 By 1967, however, the
federal government was beginning to take notice of environmental
problems. The Atomic Energy Commission had instituted a procedure
for passing construction permit requests to other interested federal
agencies for examination. 87 Comments received were sent by the AEC
to the permit seeker with a request that it work out a solution to
the problems indicated. The commissioner of the Fish and Wildlife
Service, for example, routinely assessed powerplant effects, including
thermal pollution.88 Because some federal permits were issued only
after public hearings, these comments were often- open to public ex-
amination. Utilities, however, were not compelled to consider thermal
pollution, since the regulatory authority of the AEC was confined to
considerations of radiological health and safety.89
Conservation groups have tried to add such phrases as "the public
86 When, for example, in the mid-1950's NYSE&G built Milliken Station, no federal
approval was required. A
87 See, e.g., OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ELECH-Uc POWER AND THE ENVIRON-
MiENT 9 (1970). See also Hearings on Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power
Before the Jt. Comm. on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 139, 173 (1969)
(statements of Commissioner J.T. Ramey and Commissioner T.J. Thompson).
88 A Fish and Wildlife Service comment was filed regarding Bell Station.
We understand the regulatory authority of the [AEC] is confined to consid-
erations of common defense and security and radiological health and safety.
However, we recommend and urge that, before the permit is issued, the effects
of thermal discharges, including the need for cooling facilities ...be called to
the attention of the applicant.
HANDBOOK 69 (letter from C.F. Pautzke, Commissioner, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
to H. Price, Director of Regulations, AEC, Oct. 11, 1968). The letter goes on to discuss
the thermal problems peculiar to this case.
At a conference in February 1971 between an author of this note and various
NYSE&G representatives, the author was informed that such letters by the commissioner
of the Fish and Wildlife Service were routine. Furthermore, the officials indicated that
they had responded to the Service's comments. Interview with NYSE&G officers, in Bing-
hamton, N.Y., Feb. 19, 1971. The response became part of the construction permit file. See
also Hearings 137 (statement of A.D. Tuttle).
89 The AEC, although requiring nuclear plants to obtain both construction and
operation permits, consistently maintained that it had no authority to consider environ-
mental effects beyond those caused by radiation. This position was upheld in New Hamp-
shire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969). But see notes 107-09
and accompanying text infra.
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interest" to many agency enabling acts, in order to force federal agen-
cies to consider the environmental effects of their decisions. 0 A prec-
edent was established in 1965. The Federal Power Commission had
refused to consider aesthetic and environmental effects in issuing a
permit for a hydroelectric plant at Storm King Mountain on the Hud-
son River. But the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Federal Power Act91 required consideration of such matters. 92 This
line of reasoning was available in 1967 to citizens' groups who wanted
the AEC to make its construction permits conditional on a demonstra-
tion of thermal compatibility with the environment.
Two steps in the federal control of water pollution were passage
of the Water Quality Act9s in 1965 and the Clean Water Restoration
Act 94 in 1966. These acts called for establishment of national water
quality standards and provided a means of enforcement. The Water
Quality Act declared that the states were to have "primary responsi-
bilities and rights.., in preventing and controlling water pollution." 95
As if to reinforce this concept, Congress voted down several proposals
to extend the Act's coverage to all navigable waters, thus limiting its
application solely to interstate waters.96 Federal standing to enjoin
pollution of intrastate waters97 required consent of the governor and
a showing of endangerment to health or welfare.98 The difficulty of
showing clearcut damage caused by thermal pollution and of distin-
guishing it from that caused by agricultural runoff would tend to limit
this form of federal control over utility decisions.
An additional instrument of federal control was the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899,19 still on the books in 1967. This act prohibited
90 See notes 99-101 and accompanying text infra.
91 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r (1964).
92 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 854 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
93 79 Stat. 903 (codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970)).
94 80 Stat. 1246 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970)).
95 33 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970).
By 1967, however, it was becoming apparent that the states, in reality, were not going
to have the final decision over establishing water standards. In order to receive the benefit
of the federal funds provided for in the 1965 Act, the states would have to accept at least
the minimum standards proposed by the federal government. Id. §§ 1156(c)(1), (c)(3), (d)(3).
96 That is, "all rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across or form a part of
State boundaries . . . ." Id. § 1173(e). For a discussion of the unsuccessful attempts to
extend the Act's coverage to all navigable waters, see Dunkelberger, The Federal Govern-
ment's Role in Regulating Water Pollution Under the Federal Water Quality Act of 1965,
3 NATURAL RESOURCEs LAw. 3, 12-15 (1970).
97 Cayuga Lake is intrastate and navigable. See, e.g., In re Wheeler, 51 F.2d 374
(ED.N.Y. 1981).
98 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g)(2) (1970).
99 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-13 (1970). Section 407 prohibits the discharge, without a permit,
of "any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from
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the dumping of refuse into navigable waters without a permit from the
Corps of Engineers certifying that such discharges would not impede
or obstruct navigation. To use this act to stop thermal pollution would
have required a definition of waste heat as refuse capable of hindering
navigation. In all probability the statute was never intended for such
use.100
Existing federal protection in 1967 did not sufficiently require
NYSE&G to consider the factors of major concern to environmentalists.
Consideration of environmental factors was not permitted by the AEC's
regulatory structure, and congressional acts involved uncertainties of
jurisdiction and enforcement. CSCL had found public remedies offered
little more promise than private remedies.
IV
LEGAL RESPONSE TO THF ENVIRONMENTAL CRSIS
A. The National Response
Shortly after the success of citizens' groups in Scenic Hudson Pres-
ervation Conference v. FPC,101 parties concerned with thermal pollu-
tion attempted to use the same strategy against the AEC. Suit was
brought by the state of New Hampshire and others to force the AEC
to consider the effects of thermal pollution on the Connecticut River
before issuing a powerplant construction permit. In New Hampshire
v. AEC, 10 2 however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals avoided the
opportunity to enter the field of environmental preservation. Applying
a strict interpretation of the AEC's jurisdictional statute, Judge Coffin
appealed to Congress for a proper solution.10 3 This decision perpetu-
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water ...,
whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed . . . ." For administrative
implementatioi of this Act see 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.110-.335 (1971).
100 For a history of the Act see United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 US. 482,
485-86 (1960). However, in 1966 the Supreme Court rejected the traditional concept that
an obstruction had to be a solid. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966),
it held that oil was not only "a menace to navigation" but also "a pollutant." Id. at 226.
The Court held that "[t]he word 'refuse' includes all foreign substances and pollutants"
apart from those exempted by the Act. Id. at 230. The minority, however, thought that
this had stretched the Act too far. Whether waste heat constitutes a prohibited foreign
substance or pollutant remains uncertain.
101 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
102 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 895 U.S. 962 (1969).
103 We conclude that the licensing board and the Commission properly refused to
consider the proffered evidence of thermal effects. We do so with regret that the
Congress has not yet established procedures requiring timely and comprehensive
consideration of non-radiological pollution effects in the planning of installations
to be privately owned and operated.
Id. at 176.
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ated the limited approach of the AEC and the continued construction
of powerplants without direct AEC regulation of their thermal effects.
Prompted by the growing public concern with "the environmental
crisis," Congress also began to seek ways to establish responsibility for
the risks attendant on technological advance. The first legislative
changes appeared in part to be in direct response to Judge Coffin's New
Hampshire dictum asking Congress to solve jurisdictional problems of
thermal pollution. Congress developed two tools. One is the National
Environmental Policy Act of 19691 requiring, inter alia, federal agen-
cies to prepare environmental impact statements for projects in their
domain.10 5 The other is the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970.106
Both acts affect the procedures of the AEC, as well as all other federal
agencies. 10 7 The Water Quality Improvement Act requires agency cer-
tification that new developments meet state water quality standards. 0 s
The AEC and other federal agencies can no longer ignore water qual-
ity standards.
Confirming the demise of the AEC's limited approach, the District
of Columbia Circuit recently found that the AEC violated the National
Environmental Policy Act by refusing to examine environmental is-
sues, including those relating to water quality, in its hearings and par-
mit granting procedures.10 9 The court remanded the case to the AEC
for further rule making." 0 Speaking for the court, Judge Wright
stated, "[A court's] duty, in short, is to see that important legislative
purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected
in the vast halls of the federal bureaucracy.""' Environmentalism was
thus advanced in two ways: specifically, the court forced the AEC to
make regulations dealing with environmental issues, and more broadly,
the court assumed a creative and liberal role in implementing the
National Environmental Policy Act.
These recent federal changes force the utilities to consider the en-
vironmental consequences of their plans. In New York the Department
of Environmental Conservation is charged with developing thermal
104 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
105 Id. § 4332(C).
106 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
107 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970); 33 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (1970).
108 33 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (1970).
109 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 1 ELI ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP.
20346 (1971). See also Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910
(1971).
110 Subsequently the AEC enacted new rules and regulations dealing with environ-
mental matters. 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPo-CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS 523 (Sept. 3, 1971).
111 1 ELI ENVIRONMENTAL L. REP. at 20347.
[Vol. 57:80
POWERPLANT SITING DECISIONS
impact standards required under the federal acts and granting certifi-
cates of reasonable assessment. 112 NYSE&G will not be able to begin
construction of Bell Station until it obtains New York certification.
B. The State Response
1. Retreat
While Congress was beginning to respond to environmental prob-
lems posed by private technological decisions, some state courts were
retreating from the field of pollution control. The New Hampshire
court had merely refused to take a courageous step forward; New York
courts, however, actually restricted existing private remedies in hopes
that the legislature would act to fill the gap.
This happened in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co."3 in which
the court refused to issue an injunction against an admitted polluter,
thereby questioning if not overruling Strobel and Whalen. In Whalen
the court had ignored potentially substantial damage to the paper mill,
and had granted relief to a plaintiff suffering only $100 damage. In
Boomer, however, the defendant cement plant employed over 300 peo-
ple and represented an investment in excess of $45 million. The dam-
ages to plaintiff were $185,000." 4 Economic disparity, the court said,
was a vital factor in the issuance of an injunction.
The court considered briefly the possibility of granting an injunc-
tion to take effect at some future date, giving the defendant an oppor-
tunity to develop abatement techniques. It found, however, that no
assurance could be obtained that significant technical improvement
would occur in the near future and that continued applications for
a delay of the injunction would put an undue burden on the court."15
Thus the court refused to impose the burden of providing a solution
upon the defendant, stating that the problem did not lie with the in-
dividual company, but with the industry as a whole. As such, "the
rate of the research [was] beyond [the] control of defendant.""16
The Boomer court relied on an Indiana decision, Northern In-
diana Public Service Co. v. Vesey," 7 and awarded permanent damages
in lieu of the requested injunction. Northern Indiana involved a Fort
Wayne gas plant which emitted vast quantities of smoke, steam, am-
monia, poisonous gases, soot, dirt, grease, and vile odors. The court
112 N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERV. LAW §§ 14(9), 15(l), (13) (McKinney 1970).
113 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.YS.2d 312 (1969).
114 Id. at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
115 Id. at 225-26, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17.
116 Id. at 226, 257 N.E2d at 873, 809 N.YS.2d at 317.
1"7 210 Ind. 838, 200 N.E. 620 (1936).
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found that although the plant could not be operated without destroy-
ing the plaintiff's greenhouse business, the emissions could not be
enjoined because "public convenience require[d] that the defendant
continue its operations."'118 Instead, the court said permanent damages
could be awarded. This case also involved a large disparity of economic
injury. The gas plant was valued at $3 million; damages awarded total-
led $82,570.
Bell Station differs from Boomer in that the plant has not yet been
constructed. Furthermore, in light of the uncertainty as to the environ-
mental effects of the plant's operation, economic disparity is difficult
to evaluate. On the utility's side is the cost of the land and initial site
grading, but on the environmentalists' side is the threat of irreparable
damage to the lake's ecosystems. Moreover, alternative methods of cool-
ing were available to NYSE&G, albeit at additional cost. Despite the
similar question of public convenience in both the Cayuga Lake case
and Northern Indiana, the availability of alternatives presents a strong
argument for distinguishing the cases. The distinction between cases
of necessity and convenience adopted in 1918 by the New York courts
in Bradley v. Degnon Construction Co.119 supports the idea that
the Boomer holding may not be applicable to the Cayuga Lake case.
On the other hand, the language of Boomer indicates that its
doctrine was meant to travel beyond the facts of that case. In what
appears to be "a washing of hands," the court placed great emphasis on
the recent public outcry on matters of pollution. A court is designed, it
said, only to "resolve the litigation between the parties now before it"
rather than to seek "promotion of the general public welfare."
120
Air pollution alone, the court noted, "is a problem presently far
from solution even with the full public and financial powers of
government.' u2  Any solution "is likely to require massive public
expenditure and to demand more than any local community can
accomplish and to depend more on regional and interstate controls."'
122
Thus the court indicated that only the legislature can solve pollu-
tion problems. A court entertaining an injunction suit against Bell
Station might interpret this language by the Court of Appeals to mean
that no common law injunctions are to be issued against polluters,
especially if the polluter provides a vital public service, such as elec-
trical power.
118 Id. at 847, 200 N.E. at 624.
119 224 N.Y. 60, 120 N.E. 89 (1918). See notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra.
120 26 N.Y.2d at 222, 257 NXE.2d at 871, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 228, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
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2. Recent Advances
In early 1969, CSCL scientists presented their concerns to the New
York Water Resources Commission.- But the standards proposed by the
WRC, permitting discharge which would raise surface temperature up
to three degrees Fahrenheit beyond a radius of 800 feet, 23 were con-
sidered a defeat by conservationists. Another defeat came with the
death of three bills of direct relevance to the Cayuga Lake case. The
first would have given the WRC greater power to subclassify state
waters using different standards for lakes than for streams;124 the second
would have prevented site excavation and other expenditures prior to
the issuance of a permit;12 5 the third would have limited radioactive
discharges.1
26
Meantime public activity and impending changes in legislation
created a great deal of uncertainty for NYSE&G. Expensive delays and
design changes appeared likely. In April 1969 the president of NYSE&G
announced the indefinite postponement of plans to develop Bell Sta-
tion.127 The uncertain water use cases and the regulatory structure by
which CSCL had initially despaired of remedy had in fact worked to its
advantage.
New York further responded to increasing environmental concern
by amending the state constitution, declaring it state policy "to con-
serve and protect [the state's] natural resources and scenic beauty,' 2
and by forming yet another governmental agency, the Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC).129 This agency was established in
part to coordinate diversified agency jurisdictions towards a uniform
state environmental policy. DEC was authorized to formulate a "state
wide environmental plan for the management and protection of the
123 Lakes. The water temperature at the surface of a lake shall not be raised
more than PIT over the temperature that existed before the addition of heat of
artificial origin, except that within a radius of 800 feet or equivalent area from
the point of discharge, this temperature may be exceeded. In lakes subject to
stratification, the thermal discharges shall be confined to the epilimnetic area.
6(B) N.Y. CODES, RuLEs & REGULATiONS § 704.1 (1970) (footnote omitted).
The subsequent section permits additional limitations or modifications of the standard
where necessary and places the burden of showing that the standards are unreasonable
on the applicant for a discharge permit. Id. § 7042.
124 (1969) Sen. Int. No. 4585 (Mr. Day), (1969) Assy. Int. No. 5857 (Mrs. Cook).
125 (1969) Sen. Int. No. 4814 (Rules Comm.), (1969) Assy. Int. No. 6048 (Mrs. Cook).
128 (1969) Sen. Int. No. 4560 (Mr. Day), (1969) Assy. Int. No. 6050 (Mrs. Cook).
127 Statement by William A. Lyons, supra note 5.
128 N.Y. CONsr. art. XIV, § 4. No real enforcement rights are contained in section 4. Sec-
tion 4 only establishes a state policy, possibly helpful in the interpretation of other
statutes, and directs the legislature to enact "adequate" pollution laws and to acquire
wilderness areas.
129 N.Y. ENVMONMENTAL CONSERv. LAw § 11 (McKinney 1970).
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quality of the environment and the natural resources of the state."'' 0
Environmental guidelines are to be set by public agencies prior to
damage, so that preventative rather than remedial action will become
possible for the first time.13 1
In keeping with the state's express desire to deal adequately with
environmental matters, specific legislation was devoted to the problem
of thermal pollution by nuclear plants. As part of an agency reorganiza-
tion, the WRC was transferred to the new DEC,13 2 and the Public
Health Law, which had required permits for new discharge outlets, 3
was amended to require anyone "intending to construct a nuclear
steam-electric generating facility [to] file an environmental feasibility
report"'13 4 before a construction permit could be granted. Moreover, no
one could "construct or operate any new steam-electric generating
facility ... without a permit issued in accordance with the provisions
... allowing thermal discharge from such facility to the waters of the
state. A public hearing may be conducted by the department prior to
the issuance of any such permit.' 1 35
No investment beyond site acquisition therefore is possible today
until the utility has proven to the state that the proposed plant is
compatible with the standards set to protect the environment. Setting
of state standards may be the critical act balancing the need to meet
electrical demands with effective environmental controls.13 6
Despite New York's expressed interest in centralized environmen-
tal policy decisions, recent legislation' 37 has tended to provide alternate
controls on utility siting decisions. Legislation now prohibits any entity
from beginning electrical transmission line site preparation without
first obtaining a certificate of environmental compatibility and public
need.138 Contrary to the policies behind the formation of DEC, how-
130 Id. § 80.
131 But the statutory guidelines given to DEC are vague. For example, two purposes
of DEC are to "[p]romote restoration and reclamation of degraded or despoiled areas
and natural resources" (id. § 14(14)) and to "[e]ncourage industrial, commercial, residen-
tial and community development which provides the best usage of land areas, maximizes
environmental benefits and minimizes the effects of less desirable environmental condi-
tions." Id. § 14(7).
132 Note 71 supra.
133 N.Y. PuB. HEALT LAW § 1230 (McKinney 1971).
134 Id. § (3)(a).
135 Id. § (3)(b).
136 With the WRC's current 8° F. standard, the once-through cooling system planned
by NYSE&G would be sufficient to comply; stricter standards would require NYSEfiG to
construct cooling towers.
137 N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAw §§ 120-80 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
138 Id. §§ 121, 126.
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ever, the PSC is responsible for administering this requirement, once
again fragmenting state environmental decision making. Now NYSE8CG
must receive approval from both DEC for its plant's discharge and the
PSC for its transmission lines.
Conceivably the PSC might consider the whole environmental
impact of a power station, including thermal pollution, in granting
certification for transmission lines, and thus have ultimate control
over siting decisions. By doing so, however, it might be subject to
severe judicial reprimand for exceeding its delegated responsibilities.
The legislation itself is directed specifically towards transmission lines,
and environmental considerations such as powerline cuts through
forests, soil erosion, and visual aesthetic pollution seem more directly
within the legislation's purview than thermal pollution.
Under the same law providing for the PSC transmission line
controls, New York established a temporary commission on the en-
vironmental impact of major public utility facilities.139 This commis-
sion was charged with the responsibility of drawing up "appropriate
state procedures which should be established to regulate and determine
the siting of such facilities."'14° The Commission was to propose legisla-
tion by December 1970, but at this writing no such proposals have been
made public.
Two major proposals are before the state legislature, each requir-
ing permits before a utility can even acquire a site.'4 ' Both are aimed at
requiring private parties to justify the environmental costs of their
plans prior to taking irreversible and possibly damaging action. Within
this system, NYSE&G would still make the initial decision, but before
taking action it would have to justify its decision. Although the scien-
tific problems remain unsolved, the burden of proof in New York
seems to be shifting from the public at large to the user and potential
injurer of environmental resources.
14 2
139 Act of April 29, 1970, ch. 272, § 6, [1970] N.Y. Laws 1534.
140 Id. § 6(a)(A)(iii).
141 TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF MAJOR PUB.
UTILrrY FAcimrrEs, INTERIM REPORT, exhibits V, VI. 1970 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 75.
In April 1971 Governor Rockefeller introduced a bill recommending that only one
permit be required for the siting of a powerplant and that that permit issue from the
PSC. (1971) Sen. Int. No. 6385 (Rules Comm.), (1971) Assy. Int. No. 7006 (Mr. Kelly). See
also N.Y. Times, April 12, 1971, at 44, col. 1.
142 For an example of how another state has attempted to cope with technological
advances which have outdated existing legal institutions, see MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528
(202)(1) (Supp. 1971). Michigan has created a new private remedy, making it possible for
any affected person to enforce the state antipollution laws. New York has denied private
parties this right. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 1261 (McKinney 1971).
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CONCLUSION
We have used the Cayuga Lake nuclear powerplant siting contro-
versy to indicate both institutional inadequacies with respect to utility
development and the judicial and legislative response to those inade-
quacies. Realization that environmental resources are finite has brought
about a fundamental change in legal orientation. Visible environ-
mental degradation and the prospect of continuing technological de-
velopment have forced implementation of preventative rather than
remedial measures. And the burden of proof appears to be shifting
from the public to the individual developer whose actions pose threats
to environmental quality.
National energy needs, according to the Federal Power Commis-
sion, will require 255 new nuclear powerplants by 1990.143 Public
protests, however, continue to hold up construction. The tension be-
tween the demand for electrical energy and the concern for natural
resources is exacerbated by uncertainty; technological solutions to-the
problems caused by waste heat, and indeed, the scope and nature of
the problems themselves remain largely a matter of educated specula-
tion. It is also uncertain what effect the shifting of the burden of proof
will have on future patterns of economic growth. Legislative controls
which would restrict economic growth in order to conserve the envi-
ronment may have profound social consequences.
Developing New York controls and the National Environmental
Policy Act provide the legislative potential for preventative constraints
on private decisions. The crucial question is whether or not political
issues can be resolved in order to implement this recent legislation.
Dorothy Nelkint and Kenneth R. Kupchakff
143 N.Y. Times, July 6, 1971, at 1, col. 7.
t Cornell Program on Science, Technology, and Society. A.B. 1954, Cornell University.
-- Member of the Hawaii Bar. A.B. 1964, J.D. 1971, Cornell University; B.S. 1965,
Pennsylvania State University.
ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 2 FIRST OF THE
RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The Railway Labor Act (RLA)1 provides elaborate procedures to
facilitate the voluntary settlement of major disputes2 between carriers
and their employees.3 It requires the parties both to make "every rea-
sonable effort" to negotiate a settlement 4 and to refrain from altering
the status quo while the RLA procedures are in operation.5 However,
1 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964).
2 Major disputes involve the formation of collective agreements or efforts to change
them. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-26 (1945). The fourth purpose of the
RLA, as set forth in § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1964)---"to provide for the prompt and orderly
settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions"-describes
the general subject matter of major disputes. See id. § 183 (describing the similar subject
matter for major disputes involving air carriers).
Minor disputes, on the other hand, involve grievances and the interpretation or
application of a collective agreement. Id. § 151a; see Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, supra
at 723-24. Minor disputes are processed through the grievance procedures of the collective
bargaining agreement in conferences between the carrier and employees' representatives,
and are resolved finally either by the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) or by a
system board of adjustment established by the employees' representatives and the carrier. 45
U.S.C. §§ 153 First (i), Second (Supp. V, 1970). See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago River & I.R.R., 353 US. 30 (1957). See also 45 U.S.C. §§ 184-85 (1964) (minor
dispute settlement provisions for the airline industry).
A third category of disputes involves the designation and authorization of repre-
sentatives of the employees covered by the RLA. Id. § 152 Ninth. The National Mediation
Board (NMB) has exclusive authority in representational disputes. See General Comm. v.
Missouri-K.-T.R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943); Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 320 US. 297 (1943);
note 37 infra. Sections 2 Third and Fourth make it unlawful for a carrier to interfere
with, influence, or coerce employees in organizing. Enforcement of these sections must
be had through either criminal proceedings (see note 6 infra) or petition to the courts
for injunctive relief. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas &
N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). The RLA does not provide
an administrative procedure to remedy such practices.
8 For a summary of the statutory procedures, see note 5 infra.
4 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1964); note 13 infra.
5 The major dispute procedures and status quo requirements were described suc-
cinctly by Mr. Justice Harlan in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 394 US. 369 (1969):
A party desiring to effect a change of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions
must give advance written notice. § 6. The parties must confer, § 2 Second, and
if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services
of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte
if it finds a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must
endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration,
which can take place, however, only if both consent. §§ 5 First, 7. If arbitration is
rejected and the dispute threatens "substantially to interrupt interstate commerce
to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transporta-
tion service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President," who may create
an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. § 10. While the
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the Act fails to specify means to ensure compliance with these substan-
tive and procedural obligations,6 and as a result, the task of enforcing
compliance has fallen upon the federal courts.
It is now clear that the federal courts do have the power to enforce
the procedural obligations of the RLA. Accommodation of the status
quo requirements of the major dispute procedures of the ActT and the
anti-injunction policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act8 received scant at-
tention during legislative consideration of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 9
and the 1934 amendments to the RLA.10 In light of the Supreme Court's
dispute is working its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally
alter the status quo. §§ 2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10.
Id. at 378. Thus there are three status quo provisions in the RLA. Each provision covers
a different stage of the major dispute settlement procedures:
Section 6 . . . provides that "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not
be altered" during the period from the first notice of a proposed change in agree-
ments up to and through any proceedings before the National Mediation Board.
Section 5 First provides that for 30 days following the dosing of Mediation
Board proceedings "no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose,"
unless the parties agree to arbitration or a Presidential Emergency Board is
created during the 30 days. Finally, § 10 provides that after the creation of an
Emergency Board and for 30 days after the Board has made its report to the
President, "no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to
the controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose."
Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 150-51 (1969) (footnotes
omitted).
6 The only statutory sanction applicable in general to representation and major dis-
putes is a criminal penalty directed at the carrier. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Tenth (1964). Little
use has been made of this provision. Cepero v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 195 F.2d 453
(1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 925 (1955); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 223
F. Supp. 361 (D. Del. 1963), af'd, 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048
(1969); Railway Employees' Co-op Ass'n v. Atlanta B. & C. Ry., 22 F. Supp. 510 (D.
Ga. 1938).
7 Note 5 supra.
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970). The Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits the federal courts
from issuing injunctions in most labor disputes (id. §§ 101, 104-05) and provides strict
procedural safeguards in the remaining cases (id. §§ 107-10).
) Congressman LaGuardia did indicate that the bill he sponsored in the House was
not designed to prevent injunctive relief in a case where the RLA dispute settlement
procedures had not been exhausted:
We then passed the railroad labor act, and that takes care of the whole labor
situation pertaining to the railroads. They could not possibly come under [the
Norris-LaGuardia Act] for the reason that we provided the machinery [in the
RLA] for settling labor disputes.
75 CONG. REc. 5499 (1932); see also id. at 4937-38 (remarks of Senator Blaine).
10 See Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 292, 301-02 &
nn.67-68 (1963). But see 1962 ABA SEc. LAB. REL. L. 198-99 (minority report of the Com-
mittee on Railway Labor Law).
A basis for accommodation was suggested by the Supreme Court as early as 1945 (see
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945) (dictum)) although later the Court
seemingly rejected the accommodation principle with regard to major disputes. In a foot-
note to its decision in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.R.R., 353 U.S.
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recent interpretation of the RLA requirements," however, it is quite
apparent that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not deprive federal courts
of the power to enjoin a strike or a unilateral change by the carrier in
the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions if the conduct against
which the injunction is sought violates the status quo requirements.12
30, 42 n.24 (1957), the Court stated: "The Norris-LaGuardia Act has been held to prevent
the issuance of an injunction in a railway labor case involving a 'major dispute.' Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R. Co., 321 U.S. 50."
In the Chicago River case, the union had called a strike to support its position in
a series of grievance claims pending before the NRAB. The Court unanimously held that
the procedures provided by the RLA for the settlement of such minor disputes were
compulsory and concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not deprive the federal
courts of power to issue an injunction "to vindicate the processes of the Railway Labor
Act." Id. at 41. In a later case, the Supreme Court interpreted Chicago River as holding that
a strike over a minor dispute may be enjoined to prevent a plain violation of a basic
command of the RLA and to enforce compliance with the requirement that minor disputes
be heard by the NRAB. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330,
338-9, 341 (1960).
The unfortunate dictum in footnote 24 of the Chicago River case has been severely
discounted. See Chicago, R.I & P.R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61, 66 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936 (1962); American Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l,
169 F. Supp. 777, 787-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Aaron, supra at 307-09; Harper, Major Disputes
Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. Am. L. & Com. 3, 9-10 (1969); McGuinn, Injunctive
Powers of the Federal Courts in Cases Involving Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act,
50 Gao. L.J. 46, 48-51 (1961). Each of these authorities limited the doctrine enunciated
in the Chicago River footnote to the factual context of the Toledo case cited by the Chi-
cago River Court in footnote 24. First, there was no claim by the carrier that the RLA
had been violated in the Toledo case; second, the processes of the RLA had been exhausted
when injunctive relief was sought. See notes 12 & 15 and accompanying text infra, con-
cerning the effect of exhausting the statutory procedures for major dispute settlement.
Although the Supreme Court has not elaborated further on footnote 24 of the Chicago
River case, the Court recently cited statements from that case in support of the principle
of injunctive relief for breaches of duty under the RLA. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United
Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 582 n.16 (1971).
1 Chicago 9: N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 US. 570 (1971).
12 See Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969). The Detroit
case involved an action by a railroad for an order restraining the employees from striking
before the major dispute procedures were exhausted. The union counterclaimed to pre-
vent the railroad from violating the status quo provisions of the RLA by establishing new
work assignments. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed both the district
court's dismissal of the railroad's complaint and the issuance of an injunction against
the proposed assignments changes. On certiorari the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that
the broad issue involved "the extent to which the Railway Labor Act of 1926 imposes an
obligation upon the parties to a railroad labor dispute to maintain the status quo while
the 'purposely long and drawn out' procedures of the Act are exhausted." Id. at 143 (foot-
notes omitted). Specifically, the Court held that the status quo obligation of both parties
was to preserve actual working conditions and practices out of which the dispute arose,
including working conditions not specifically covered in an existing collective agreement.
In interpreting the R.LA the Court stated: "The Act's status quo requirement is central to
its design. Its immediate effect is to prevent the union from striking and management
from doing anything that would justify a strike." Id. at 150.
The Supreme Court has held, however, that once the statutory procedures are ex-
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Given that the federal courts can enforce the procedural require-
ments of the RLA, it does not necessarily follow that the judiciary has
power to enforce the substantive obligation of section 2 First that the
parties make "every reasonable effort" to settle major disputes.'3 Only
recently has the Supreme Court ruled affirmatively on this question. In
Chicago & North Western Railway v. United Transportation Union,14
the Supreme Court held that compliance with the Act's "reasonable
effort" requirement is enforceable in the courts.15
hausted the parties may exercise self help in adjusting their dispute. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963); accord, Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377-80 (1969). Moreover, in
enforcing the procedural requirments of the RLA the court does not have jurisdiction
to adjudicate the merits of the dispute. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711,
724-25 (1945); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 518 (1937); Rutland Ry.
Corp. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 954 (1963).
The Supreme Court's attitude in the Detroit case towards enforcement of the pro-
cedural requirements of the RLA should be reviewed with regard to the recent decision
in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 898 U.S. 235 (1970). There, the Court re-
versed its earlier decision in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), and held
that in an action under section 801 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), where the employer has agreed contractually to arbitrate a dispute,
the federal courts may enjoin strikes in violation of a contractual no-strike clause. The
Court, by extending the accommodation rationale to injunction suits under section 801
of the LMRA, reaffirmed the view that the union's right to strike, although protected by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, nevertheless must be tempered by congressionally imposed con-
ciliation obligations on both management and labor. 398 U.S. at 249-53.
The purposes of contractually imposed obligations to arbitrate and of the statutorily
prescribed procedures for noncompulsory settlement of major railroad disputes are similar:
the "settlement of . . . disputes without resort to strikes, lockouts, or other self-help
measures." Id. at 249. It is true that the arbitration route ends in a binding determina-
tion for the parties whereas the RLA major dispute procedures, once exhausted, permit
self help; but this is of little consequence. The basic purposes of the arbitration and
RLA procedures respectively, are "obviously . . . undercut if there is no immediate,
effective remedy for those very tactics that arbitration [or the RLA dispute settlement
procedures are] designed to obviate." Id. The rationale supporting enforcement of
the compulsory arbitration provisions for minor disputes in the RLA, such as that in the
Boys Market case regarding contractual arbitration, is also applicable in compelling com-
pliance with the major dispute settlement procedures. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Chicago River & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
13 It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert
every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay,
rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of
the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interrup-
tion to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute
between the carrier and the employees thereof.
Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2 First, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
14 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
15 The Court's decision of necessity limits its prior holding that once the procedures
established for the settlement of major disputes are formally exhausted, the RLA permits
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The basis of the major dispute in the Chicago & North Western
Railway case concerned the number of brakemen to be employed on
the railway's trains. The dispute was initiated, negotiated, and medi-
ated in accordance with the technical provisions of the RLA. When
arbitration was rejected by the United Transportation Union (UTU),
the National Mediation Board (NMB) terminated its services; an emer-
gency board was not appointed.
Shortly after the expiration of the terminal status quo period, the
railway filed suit in the district court alleging that the union had vio-
lated section 2 First by not exerting "every reasonable effort" towards
agreement during the statutory period for major dispute settlement.
The railway argued that in violating section 2 First the union had not
discharged all of its obligations under the RLA. The railway asked the
court to declare that the RLA procedures had not been exhausted and
to enjoin the UTU from exercising self help in the form of a strike.
The district court dismissed the complaint, stating that section 2
First was exclusively a matter for administrative determination by the
NMB and was not justiciable. 6 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed for similar reasons, 17 despite contrary authority in the Fourth
Circuit.' 8 Although other circuits had considered controversies arising
the parties to resort to self help. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore 9:
O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284, 291 (1963). The Court's decision in the B&O case is justifiable only
insofar as it applies to the procedural requirements of the Act. Once the major dispute
settlement procedures are terminated, an action to compel a party to exhaust the proce-
dural steps is, indeed, moot. Technical compliance with the major dispute procedures,
however, does not necessarily indicate that the substantive obligation of section 2 First
has been met. If a party has not in fact exerted "every reasonable effort" towards settle-
ment, then that party is not in compliance with the substantive requirement for major
dispute settlement which is at the "heart" of the Railway Labor Act. The formal termina-
tion and technical exhaustion of the procedures become irrelevant because, in reality,
a party has violated the RLA unless it makes "every reasonable effort" to settle major
disputes during the conferences, negotiations, and mediation sessions. Formal exhaustion
of the procedures established for promoting the adjustment of major disputes cannot
remedy a violation of the "reasonable effort" obligation. Accordingly, a party that has
failed to comply with the obligation imposed by the RLA has not met the prerequisites
to the lawful exercise of self help.
16 Chicago S. N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, No. 18,145 (N.D. I., Dec. 16, 1969),
quoted in 422 F.2d 979, 982 (7th Cir. 1970).
17 422 F.2d 979, 985-89 (7th Cir. 1970). The court of appeals ruled that section 2
First of the RLA may not be enforced by a court order enjoining a union's strike
against a carrier since that provision was intended to play an integral part in facilitating
other more specific provisions of the RLA, compliance with which is enforced by the NMB.
Is Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl, 416 F.2d 633, 636 & n.6
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926 (1970) (citing cases in accord with its determina-
tion that section 2 First is justiciable).
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under section 2 First, the Seventh Circuit was the first expressly to
consider the issue of justiciability.19 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari2 and reversed the Seventh Circuit.21
In deciding that section 2 First imposes a legal obligation enforce-
able by the judiciary rather than by the NMB, the Supreme Court
stated that it would not determine the means by which the federal
courts should approach and enforce the section 2 First obligation or
the standard by which the duty "to exert every reasonable effort"
should be assessed.22 The Court thus left the task of enforcing the rea-
sonable effort obligation to the lower courts.
I
THE PIMARY ROLE OF THE NMB
An accommodation between the respective roles of the courts and
the NMB is needed in order to promote compliance with section 2
First. In the Chicago & North Western Railway case the Supreme Court
cited considerable authority in support of its decision that section 2
First imposes an obligation enforceable by the judiciary.23 The Court
emphasized the nonadjudicatory role of the NBM24 and concluded
19 Opinions of various federal courts that § 2 First is justiciable are, at best, dicta.
See, e.g., Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 425 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1970);
Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 416 F.2d 633, 636-37 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926 (1970); United Indus. Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston
Wharves, 400 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B.R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 597-98, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1967), aff'g 253 F.
Supp. 538, 539-40 (D.D.C. 1966), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968); Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 383 F.2d 225, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047 (1968);
Long Island R.R. v. System Fed'n No. 156, 368 F.2d 50,53 (2d Cir. 1966); Pan Am. World Air-
ways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840, 849 (2d Cir. 1962); Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 302 F.2d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 1962); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v.
Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 US. 936 (1962);
Norfolk & P.B.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34, 45 n.6 (4th Cir.
1957); Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 239 F.2d 37, 43-44 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); Transportation Union v. Burlington N., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1971);
Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 307 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (N.D. Ga. 1970),
af'd, 439 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1971); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Railway Employes' Dep't, 301
F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1969); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry.
Clerks, 185 F. Supp. 350, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, Int'l, 169 F. Supp. 777, 787-90, 793, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
20 400 US. 818 (1970).
21 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
22 Id. at 583, 584.
23 Id. at 578-81.
24 Id. at 581, citing Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 158
(1969).
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that therefore judicial supervision of the "reasonable effort" obligation
was required. It is apparent from the Court's opinion that the NMB
cannot exercise the exclusive power to enforce section 2 First,25 despite
contrary holdings in the Seventh Circuit and the Northern District of
Illinois.26
Although compliance with section 2 First is justiciable, nothing in
the statutory language, history, or judicial interpretations indicates
that the federal courts must play the exclusive role in enforcing the
"reasonable effort" obligation. The National Mediation Board may not
have exclusive power to promote compliance with section 2 First, but
it should not be entirely precluded from preventing or remedying vio-
lations of section 2 First during the mediation stage of the major dis-
pute settlement procedures.
A procedure by which the NMB in the first instance attempts to
enforce compliance with the section 2 First obligation seems desirable
as a matter of policy. Such a procedure is not compelled by statute, but
neither is it prevented by the Chicago &' North Western Railway deci-
sion. The NMB plays a dominant role in the procedures for non-
compulsory settlement of major disputes.2 7 Because of its proximity to
the parties during mediation, the NMB is better qualified in the first
instance to determine if the parties are exerting reasonable efforts to-
wards a resolution of their dispute. Although there is no official indica-
tion that the NMB has attempted to promote compliance with section
2 First, the NMB is well aware of the essential nature of the duties the
Act imposes on each party.28 It is, therefore, consistent with the media-
tory role of the NMB for it to exact compliance with the "reasonable
effort" requirement.
The NMB acts only as a "catalyst for settlement" and not as an
adjudicator of conduct;2 9 to alter the role in which its expertise and
authority lie would compromise the mediatory function.30 Thus, the
performance of any enforcement function must not interfere with NMB
effectiveness in mediation.
Initial recognition by the NMB mediator that a party is acting
contrary to the mandate of section 2 First need only be informal. 1 If
25 Id. at 580-81 & n.14.
26 See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra.
27 See Railway Labor Act of 1926, §§ 5-6, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155-56 (1964).
28 See, e.g., NMB, THiRTY-FIFTm ANNUAL REPORT 3-16, 36-40 (1969).
29 IAM v. NMB, 425 F.2d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1970), interpreting General Comm. v.
Missouri-K.-T.R.R., 326 U.S. 323, 337 (1943).
30 Id. at 539 & nn.10-11; see D. RIcHBEsc, LAaOk UNION MONOPOLY 30 (1957).
31 In the context of a procedure in which mediation is so essential, the reasonable
efforts needed to reach agreement might be better promoted informally by the Mediation
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exhortations prove ineffective, the NMB can attempt to ensure com-
pliance with the obligation through its statutory power to maintain
the status quo. 2
Considered to be within the Board's duty to use its "best efforts"
to promote agreement, is its retention of jurisdiction until it is satisfied
that the parties are exerting the reasonable efforts necessary for bar-
gaining under the RLA.3 3 The NMB would be acting in accordance
with the purposes of the Act by refusing to terminate its jurisdiction
over the dispute when retention of jurisdiction might assure the "rea-
sonable effort" necessary to reach agreement.3 4 Of course if the parties
do bargain in good faith and are still unable to reach agreement
through mediation, mediation has proved unsuccessful. The Board
should then proffer arbitration and ultimately release the parties to
self help.
II
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Although the Railway Labor Act contemplates judicial enforce-
ment of the section 2 First obligation, 5 judicial scrutiny should be
restricted when the NMB already has acted in a major dispute.36 The
NMB, in acting to promote compliance with the "reasonable effort"
obligation, should not be expected to follow the outlines of the con-
ventional administrative process. For example, the NMB cannot and
should not make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
Board than by an adjudicatory agency such as the National Labor Relations Board, which
employs a formal procedure comparable to the "reasonable effort" obligation for enforcing
a bargaining requirement. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1970).
32 The RLA sets few standards with respect to the conduct of the NMB during the
mediation stage. The only direct limitation on the NMB's authority over the dispute
settlement procedures is contained in section 5 First, which requires that if the offer of
arbitration is refused, "the Board shall at once notify both parties in writing that its media-
tory efforts have failed .... " § 5 First, 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964). Unless the parties later accept
arbitration or an emergency board is appointed, the parties may resort to self help 50 days
after the NMB termination notice. Id.
83 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 US. 570, 581 (1971); cf. id.,
422 F.2d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 1970).
84 See Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.. 142, 149 (1969);
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Florida & E.C.R.R., 384 U.S. 238, 246 (1966): "[The proce-
dures of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and
practical considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute."
85 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Tramp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 580 (1971).
36 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
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to the parties' compliance with section 2 First.3 7 Moreover, the process
of mediation is essentially private and informal, and the mediation
agency must remain mutually acceptable if it is to function efficiently
as a catalyst for settlement.38 Thus no policy of reviewability as found
in the National Labor Relations Act89 or in the Administrative Pro-
37 Because the authors of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 "desired to keep the media-
tion board in the condition where it is persona grata to both parties," a proposal to give
the mediation board the power to report facts was rejected. Hearings on S. 2306 Before the
Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1926) (statement of
A. P. Thorn, railroad spokesman) [hereinafter cited as 1926 Senate Hearings]. The
authors of the Act stated during the Senate and House hearings that the function of the
NMB would be restricted to conciliation and persuasion, The principal spokesman for
the unions and the railroads not only endorsed the judicial enforceability of section 2 First,
but he also stated that the NMB was not to "render any decision," "make findings," or
become a "sort of super-labor board" while functioning in its mediatory capacity during
the dispute settlement procedures. Hearings on H.R. 7180 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 89 (1926) (statement of
Donald R. Richberg, union spokesman) [hereinafter cited as 1926 House Hearings]; id.
at 131, 136 (statement of A. P. Thorn); see 1926 Senate Hearings 11, 13 (statement of
A. P. Thorn).
The legislative history of the 1934 amendments does not reflect an intent to alter
the exclusively mediatory, nonadjudicatory role of the NMB with respect to major
disputes. An exception to the general principle-that the NMB acts solely in a mediatory
and nonadjudicatory capacity-was the specific amendment in 1934 authorizing the NMB
to decide representation disputes. Railway Labor Act of 1934, ch. 691, § 2 Ninth,
45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth (1964). Although amending the RLA in this regard, Con-
gress indicated that no change regarding major disputes was intended. See H.R.
REP. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (the amendments do "not change the
methods [regarding] . . .major disputes'); S. REP. No. 1064, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934)
(the powers of the NMB "are wholly persuasive'); Garrison, Labor Relations in the
Railroad Industry, 17 ACAD. POL. SCi. PROC. 163, 166 (1937) ("Congress . . . , in creating
the new Mediation Board, gave it no judicial functions.'). See also Redenius, Airlines: The
Railway Labor Act or the Labor Management Relations Act?, 20 LAB. L.J. 293, 299 (1969).
The statutory language of the current RLA confirms what is made evident by its
legislative history. In defining the mediatory role of the NMB, Congress simply directed
it to "use its best efforts" to bring the parties to agreement, to "endeavor ... to induce
the parties to submit their controversy to arbitration" if mediation is unsuccessful, and
to "notify both parties in writing that its mediatory efforts have failed" if arbitration
is refused. 45 U.S.C. § 155 First (1964).
Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized the limitations on NMB procedures in
cases other than those regarding representation disputes: "[It] has no adjudicatory
authority with regard to major disputes, nor has it a mandate to issue regulations con-
struing the Act generally." Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S.
142, 158-59 (1969). See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 US. 570, 581
(1971).
38 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1208.1, .3(a), .5(a), .6(a)-(b) (1971).
39 See National Labor Relations Act §§ 10(c), (e), (f), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(c), (e), (f)
(1970). Section 10(e) provides: "The findings of the [National Labor Relations] Board with
respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered
as a whole shall be conclusive." Accord, § 10(f). See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A
Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 H~Av. L. REv. 367 (1968).
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cedure Act4" is appropriate in assessing the activities of the NMB or
the conduct of the parties during the mediation stage of the major
dispute settlement procedures.41 The NMB should not be called upon
subsequent to the termination of mediation to explain or defend what
action it may have taken in promoting compliance or remedying viola-
tions of section 2 First.4
To facilitate the delicate role of the NMB in promoting reasonable
efforts to agree, its release of jurisdiction pursuant to section 5 of the
RLA should give rise to a presumption of compliance with section 2
First during the period of mediation.43 A corollary of this presumption
is that a judicial challenge to the reasonable efforts of one party, brought
during the mediation stage, must be dismissed as untimely, pending
the possible resolution of the dispute through mediation.
In order to overcome the presumption of compliance with the
"reasonable effort" obligation, the complainant should have the burden
of proving that a clear violation of the act has occurred.44 Until such
a burden is met, a federal court should refuse to issue an injunction
and compel compliance with the section 2 First obligation.
The practical effect of this allocation of roles between the federal
40 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, §§ 10(a), (e), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (1970); see
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 887 U.S. 136, 140 (1967); Saferstein, supra note 89.
41 See K. DAvis, ADMINsrATiVE LAw TEXT 519 (1959): "Experience has now proved
that judicial review impairs an administrative program only when the review involves
undue substitution of judicial for administrative judgment on problems within the
agency's special competence."
42 See note 38 supra.
43 The strength of the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative enactment
exemplifies that which should be afforded to the presumption of compliance with section
2 First. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935); Note,
The Presumption of Constitutionality Reconsidered, 86 COLUm. L. REy. 283 (1936). See
IAM v. NMB, 425 F.2d 527 (D.C. 1970).
The Mediation Board is entitled to as strong a presumption as the legislature,
that if any state of facts might be supposed that would support its action, those
facts must be presumed to exist. It has long been the law that the presumption of
constitutionality available to a legislative enactment is also available to an ad-
ministrative regulation.
Id. at 540, citing Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, supra (footnote omitted).
The lAM case involved an action by a union to compel the Mediation Board to
terminate mediation and proffer arbitration during a major dispute pursuant to section
5 First. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the action because of
the strong statutory language favoring arbitration and because of the union's assertion of
the basic right to resort to self help 30 days after the Board relinquishes control over the
dispute. However, the court held that Congress did not contemplate that the Board
could be called on to explain its reasons for refusing to proffer arbitration, that the
Board's action was entitled to a presumption of validity, and that the action could be
overturned only on the basis of objective facts establishing that it was patently arbitrary.
44 See Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 870 U.S. 936 (1962).
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courts and the NMB would be in most cases to preclude court review
of an alleged violation of section 2 First on the merits. For the most
part, the role of the federal courts would be limited to deciding whether,
on the face of the record, the parties have exhausted all procedures
for the resolution of major disputes.4 5 If a suit alleging violation of
section 2 First is brought prior to the termination of mediation, the
court will be obliged to refuse jurisdiction until NMB action has run
its course. Once the procedures for mediation have been exhausted, the
court should defer to the presumption of compliance.4 6
Judicial scrutiny of the section 2 First obligation will not be for-
eign to the federal courts. With the exception of the Seventh Circuit
in Chicago & North Western Railway,47 these courts have accepted ju-
risdiction and have reviewed alleged violations of section 2 First, with-
out discussing the justiciability of that section .4  Although no court
has adopted a presumption of compliance based upon the exercise of
and deference to the mediatory function of the NMB 4 9 the courts have
45 See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284, 290
(1963).
46 The only conceivable situation in which a party could overcome the presumption
and thereby prove a clear violation of the section 2 First obligation involves what might
be called a per se violation. A refusal to bargain over subjects encompassed by the terms
"rates of pay, rules, and working conditions" found in section 2 First would constitute a
per se violation. See Harper, supra note 10, at 29-34; cf. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). However, an outright refusal to bargain, i.e., to "treat with,"
is a violation of the RLA, § 2 Ninth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth (1964). See Virginian Ry. v.
System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
Insistence upon a contract term which is clearly an illegal subject for bargaining
such as segregated seniority lines would also amount to a per se violation of section 2
First. See Richardson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1957) (holding a
carrier liable for entering into racially discriminatory bargaining agreements in violation
of "the duty to 'make and maintain agreements' in compliance with the provisions of
the Railway Labor Act" imposed upon the railroad by section 2 First); see also Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768
(1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944); cf. Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 262 F2d 359
(6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959).
47 But cf. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 302 F.2d 540, 544 (7th
Cir. 1962) (wherein the court did review an alleged violation of section 2 First).
48 See, e.g., Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 425 F.2d 1086 (2d
Cir. 1970); Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 416 F.2d 633, 636 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926 (1970); Akron & B.B.R.R. v. Order of Ry. Conductors,
253 F. Supp. 538, 539-40 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Akron & B.B.R.R. 385 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968); Southern
Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 223 F. Supp. 296, 305 (M.D. Ga. 1962), aff'd,
324 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1963).
49 But see United Transp. Union v. Burlington, 325 F. Supp. 1125, 1131 (D.D.C. 1970).
But cf. IAM v. NMB, 425 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1970); note 43 supra.
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been reluctant to find a violation of the "basic command" of the RLA
in the conduct of a party.50 Thus the results are as likely to be the
same in a case in which the presumption of compliance is adopted as
in a case in which a court applies no presumption, but reviews an al-
legation on the merits. An approach utilizing the presumption of
compliance, however, would not only spare scarce judicial resources,
but would also promote a uniform application by the NMB of the
substantive "reasonable effort" obligation in mediation.51
Moreover, this proposed approach might minimize the dangers
that the Supreme Court foresaw when it held section 2 First justiciable:
(1) "that parties will structure their negotiating positions and tactics
with an eye on the courts, rather than restricting their attention to
the business at hand"; 52 (2) that "the party seeking to maintain the
status quo may be less willing to compromise during the determinate
processes of the Railway Labor Act if he believes that there is a chance
of indefinitely postponing the other party's resort to self-help after
those procedures have been exhausted";53 and (3) that "the vagueness
of the obligation under § 2 First could provide a cover for freewheel-
ing judicial interference in labor relations of the sort that called forth
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the first place."' 4
Of course, court jurisdiction over alleged violations of section 2
First is exclusive in situations over which the NMB does not exercise
50 See, e.g., Chicago R.I. & P.R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61, 67, 70 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936 (1962). In the Chicago case, the Second Circuit reversed
an injunction entered by the district court on the ground that the union had not engaged
in good faith efforts to reach final agreement with the carriers. Reviewing the history of
bargaining between the parties, the court of appeals concluded that the failure of the
union negotiating committee to recommend the carriers' pattern settlement did not "make
the Union's conduct so wholly arbitrary as to pass beyond the bounds of good faith
endeavor to reach agreement." Id. at 70. Although the court assumed for the purposes of
its decision that the RLA imposed a greater duty to try to reach agreement than did the
NLRA, it held that neither party could be compelled to abandon a position reasonably
taken. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840,
849 (2d Cir. 1962); Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 223 F. Supp. 296,
307 (M.D. Ga. 1962), afJ'd, 324 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1963); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Airline
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 185 F. Supp. 77, 80 (D. Minn. 1960). But cf. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v.
Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 416 F.2d 633, 636 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 926
(1970).
51 To delegate to the federal courts in the first instance the job of determining what
constitutes "reasonable effort" in the context of the dispute settlement provisions would
result in an issue by issue, case by case evaluation of the relevant facts by the courts in
the 11 circuits. Cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 383 F.2d 225, 229
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047 (1968).
52 402 U.S. 570, 583 (1971).
53 Id.
54 Id.
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mediatory jurisdiction. For example, the NMB's jurisdiction does not
extend to the conferences required by section 6r5 that precede media-
tion under section 5 First.56 In addition, once the NMB terminates
mediation, it has no jurisdiction during the thirty-day cooling off
period which immediately follows. 57 The RLA makes provision for
NMB supervision during neither the status quo period following the
appointment of an emergency board under section 10, the cooling off
period after an emergency board report,58 nor the terminal period of
self help.
Some cases initially involving exclusive court jurisdiction may be-
come moot if subsequent to the institution of a suit the parties enter
a different stage of the dispute settlement process. In such instances the
court should decline jurisdiction. The court should decline jurisdic-
tion, for example, if the carrier charges that the union has failed to
comply with the "reasonable effort" requirement during the initial
conference stage, and subsequent to the institution of the suit the
NMB initiates mediation. Of course, the court may permit the suit
in the extraordinary case where the complaint, as supported by the
objective facts, alleges a so-called per se violation of section 2 First.59
In those cases which a court must decide on the merits, a standard
for assessing the "reasonable effort" obligation is necessary. Indeed,
such a standard needs articulation so that the parties, the NMB, and
the courts can best understand the nature of the obligation to which
adherence is commanded.
III
THE "REAsoNABLE EFFORT" STANDARD
Both the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations
Act require the parties to bargain, 0 and both statutes give substantive
content to the bargaining requirement through statutory standards.
The NLRA imposes a dual obligation "to meet ... and confer" and
to bargain "in good faith."6' 1 The RLA also requires the parties to a
55 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
56 Id. § 155 First; see, e.g., Long Island R.R. v. System Fed'n No. 156, 368 F.2d 50
(2d Cir. 1966); Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 307 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ga.
1970).
57 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1964).
5s Id. § 160.
59 See note 46 supra.
60 Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2 Ninth, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth (1964); National Labor
Relations Act §§ 8(a)(5), (b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1970).
61 National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
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major dispute to meet and confer, 2 but it is not so explicit as the
NLRA in providing a standard by which to assess the parties' conduct
during the course of major dispute settlement. Inasmuch as the RLA
has as its purpose the peaceful settlement of disputes, 63 the duty "to
exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements"6 4
clearly contemplates something more than the mere requirement to
meet and confer.
One standard suggested by the language of section 2 First is the
test of reasonableness.65 An application of this standard by the NMB
or the federal courts would, in effect, tend to force a resolution of the
major dispute upon the parties. The language of the RLA does not
explicitly preclude the NMB or the courts from "compel[ling] either
party to agree to a proposal or requir[ing] the making of a conces-
sion."66 However, the legislative history indicates that Congress re-
jected provisions designed to compel agreements.6 7 The noncompulsory
nature of the major dispute settlement procedures has been emphasized
in judicial discussions of the Act.68 The anomalous result is that the
"reasonable effort" requirement does not in fact oblige the parties
to conduct themselves as the reasonable man would have acted.
69
It is generally accepted in the lower federal courts that a require-
62 Railway Labor Act §§ 2 Second, 6, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152 Second, 156 (1964).
63 See Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148-49 (1969).
64 Railway Labor Act § 2 First, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1964).
65 See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 32, at 149-51 (4th ed. 1971).
66 National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
67 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
(1969):
Both before and after enactment of the Railway Labor Act, as well as during
congressional debates on the bill itself, proposals were advanced for replacing this
final resort to economic warfare with compulsory arbitration and antistrike laws.
But although Congress and the Executive have taken emergency ad hoc measures
to compel the resolution of particular controversies, no such general provisions
have ever been enacted. And for the settlement of major disputes,
the statutory scheme retains throughout the traditional voluntary processes of
negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and condliation. Every fadlity
for bringing about agreement is provided and pressures for mobilizing public
opinion are applied. The parties are required to submit to the successive pro-
cedures designed to induce agreement. § 5 First (b). But compulsions go only
to insure that those procedures are exhausted before resort can be had to
self-help. No authority is empowered to decide the dispute and no such power
is intended, unless the parties themselves agree to arbitration.
Id. at 379-80, quoting Elgin, J. & E.R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945) (footnotes
omitted).
68 See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 579 n.11 (1971);
Elgin, J. & E.R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No.
40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937); IAM v. NMB, 425 F.2d 527, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
69 See W. PROssER, supra note 65.
[Vol. 57:105
RLA ENFORCEMENT
ment of "good faith" bargaining satisfies the obligation "to exert every
reasonable effort."7 0 There is little discussion in the lower court
opinions about the derivation of a "good faith" standard from a
statute that uses the "reasonable effort" language;71 but "good faith"
is a logical interpretation and appears to have been adopted as a
matter of convenience.
7 2
Congress used a requirement similar to section 2 First in the
Labor Management Relations Act of 194773 both to describe the duty
to bargain in good faith74 and to promote agreement during the injunc-
tion period of the national emergency strike provisions.75 The federal
70 See Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 416 F.2d 633, 636 & n.6
(4th Cir. 1969) (citing cases in accord); Harper, supra note 10, at 34-36; Highsaw, The
Need for Re-Evaluation of Labor Legislation, 35 J. Am L. & CoM. 450, 455 (1969). But see
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 936 (1962) (court assumed for the purposes of its decision that the RLA imposed
some greater duty to try to reach agreement than did the NLRA).
There is no official indication as to what standard the NMB would apply in enforcing
section 2 First. The administrative regulations of the NMB merely restate the section 2
First language in reviewing the obligation imposed on the parties during the mediation
stage. 29 C.F.R: § 1204.1 (1971).
71 See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl, 169 F. Supp. 777,
793 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
72 The Supreme Court has made several references by dicta to a standard of good
faith. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 721-22 n.12 (1945). Citing to section 2
First, the Supreme Court in Burley noted that
one of the statute's primary commands, judicially enforceable, is found in the
repeated declaration of a duty upon all parties to a dispute to negotiate ....
This duty is not merely perfunctory. Good faith exhaustion of the possibility of
agreement is required to fulfill it.
Id. The Court thus apparently equated the "reasonable effort" requirement with that of
"good faith." See also Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S.
284, 289, 291 (1968). Cf. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 800 U.S. 515, 550 (1937)
("Whether an obligation has been discharged, and whether action taken or omitted is in
good faith or reasonable, are everyday subjects of inquiry by courts in framing and en-
forcing their decrees.'). However, the Court has shed less light on the meaning of the
"reasonable effort" obligation than it has on the enforceability of section 2 First. In
Chicago & N.W. Ry. the Court declined to determine "whether § 2 First requires more...
than avoidance of 'bad faith' . . . ." 402 U.S. 570, 579 n.11 (1971).
73 Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 186 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18 & 29 U.S.C.).
74 In order to prevent or minimize interruptions of the free flow of commerce
growing out of labor disputes, employers and employees and their representatives,
in any industry affecting commerce, shall-(1) exert every reasonable effort to
make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and working con-
ditions, including provision for adequate notice of any proposed change in the
terms of such agreements ....
29 U.S.C. § 174(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
75 Whenever a district court has issued an order under section 178 of this title
enjoining acts or practices which imperil or threaten to imperil the national
health or safety, it shall be the duty of the parties to the labor dispute giving rise
to such order to make every effort to adjust and settle their differences, with the
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courts have applied the standard of "good faith" in assessing these two
provisions.7
6
It is apparent that Congress intended to require more than con-
ferences but something less than "reasonableness" for satisfaction of
the substantive obligation of section 2 First. "Every reasonable effort"
represents an intermediate standard which can best be described as
good faith. The test should be "whether under all the facts and circum-
stances the [parties] . . . acted in good faith-that is to say with a
sincere desire to reach an agreement-or whether they acted in bad
faith-that is, with the affirmative intention not to reach agreement."
77
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assistance of the [Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service] created by this
chapter. Neither party shall be under any duty to accept, in whole or part, any
proposal of settlement made by the Service.
Id. § 179(a) (emphasis added).
76 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956); United States v. Inter-
national Longshoremen's Ass'n, 246 F. Supp. 849, 855-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); cf. Seafarers Int'l
Union v. United States, 304 F.2d 437, 445 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 262, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
77 American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 169 F. Supp. 777, 794 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); see NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (Ist Cir. 1953).
In assessing the standard of good faith under the RLA, the NMB, the federal courts,
and the parties are not without guidance. Besides the ample body of case law discussing
the good faith efforts under the RLA (see note 70 supra), appropriate factors considered
in enforcing the good faith bargaining obligation under the NLRA may be used in
analyzing the parties' reasonable efforts to reach agreement in RLA disputes. See Norfolk
& P.B.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34, 45 n.6 (4th Cir. 1957) ("nego-
tiation required by the Act is the same 'good faith' bargaining required by the Labor
Management Relations Act ... . ); cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1969).
The Supreme Court has stated two caveats that should be considered in enforcing
the "reasonable effort" obligation:
First, parallels between the duty to bargain in good faith and the duty to exert
every reasonable effort, like all parallels between the NLRA and the Railway
Labor Act, should be drawn with the utmost care and with full awareness of the
differences between the statutory schemes .... Second, great circumspection should
be used in going beyond cases involving "desire not to reach an agreement," for
doing so risks infringement of the strong federal labor policy against governmental
interference with the substantive terms of collective-bargaining agreements ...
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 579 n.11 (1971).
t A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971, Cornell University.
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE, THE AUTOMOBILE, AND
ECOLOGICAL AWARENESS: AN AFFIRMATIVE
ROLE FOR THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA
IN THE POLLUTION CRISIS
When the Federal Communications Commission in 1967 ap-
plied the fairness doctrine to the advertising of cigarettes on radio and
television,' the broadcast industry responded with a unanimous chorus
of outrage and opposition. Prominent among opposition arguments
was the so-called parade of horribles: the opponents argued that the
decision could not logically be confined to cigarettes and that contro-
versial issues of public importance also requiring reply time might
be raised by advertising of automobiles, beer and wine, detergents,
high cholesterol foods, and even toothpaste with flouride.2 The feared
extensions of the cigarette ruling, however, have not in fact material-
ized, largely because the FCC, in what seems an effort to protect com-
mercial broadcasting, has steadfastly maintained that cigarettes are
"unique" and that all other product advertising is immune from reply
burdens.8
1 Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967); Television Station WCBS-TV,
8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967).
For comment on this ruling, see Leventhal, Caution: Cigarette Commercials May Be
Hazardous to Your License-The New Aspect of Fairness, 22 FED. CoM. B.J. 55 (1968);
Lynd, Banzhaf v. FCC: Public Interest and the Fairness Doctrine, 23 Fm. Com. B.J. 39
(1969); Note, Implications of the Extension of the Fairness Doctrine to Editorial Expres-
sions Implied in Commercial Advertising, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 452 (1970); Note, Fairness,
Freedom and Cigarette Advertising: A Defense of the Federal Communications Com-
mission, 67 CoLum. L. R.y. 1470 (1967); 53 IowA L. Ray. 480 (1967).
2 See Leventhal, supra note 1, at 116-18; FORTUNE, July 1967, at 72. Cf. Television
Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 954 (1967) (concurring opinion); Blalock, Television
and Advertising, 28 Fm. B.J. 341, 346 (1968).
The Federal Communications Commission has echoed these broadcaster fears:
(A] great number of products commonly advertised over the broadcast media
have pollution consequences; cars because of their gasoline engines; gasoline
itself; airplanes; detergents; and, indeed, every product that is normally packaged
in a non-biodegradable container. Commercials urging use of these products
or services thus can be argued to raise implicit ecological questions. Other product
commercials, similarly, could be argued to raise significant national policy ques-
tions: commercials promoting the use of aspirin, tranquilizers, soporifics, etc., on
the ground that they indirectly promote overuse of drugs generally and thus
might lead to harmful, illegal drug use; commercials depicting women in a
manner charged to be offensive to the national policy of equal rights and equal
treatment of the sexes; etc. It is not necessary to list more examples. The con-
tention is that, almost without exception, product commercials can be argued
to raise some significant, controversial issue-and as public awareness grows, so,
too, does the occasion for making such arguments.
Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C.2d 26, 30-31 (1971) (footnote omitted).
3 Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 746 (1970), remanded, No. 24,556 (D.C. Cir.,
Aug. 16, 1971); Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 943 (1967).
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In its reluctance to expand the scope of the cigarette ruling the
FCC seems to be acting with greater discretion than valor. Today
America's industrial, consumption oriented economy is coming under
increasing attack by ecological action groups. The alarming predictions
of ten years ago are rapidly becoming fact: America may suffocate in
the products and by-products of her industrial maturity. Some products
advertised on television and radio may pose greater threats to the
public health than cigarettes ever could. This is especially true of the
automobile, by far the major polluter of the country's air.4 Advertising
that promotes the purchase and use of automobiles and ignores the
deadly ecological effects of the internal combustion engine presents
only one side of controversial issues of economic policy, public health,
and the cultural tension between industrial expansion and the quality
of individual life.5 The fairness doctrine should be applied to such
advertising to ensure that both sides of these issues are heard. Such an
application of the doctrine is commanded in policy and firmly based
on the cigarette advertising precedent.
I
THE FAIRNEss DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICABILITY
TO PRODUCT ADVERTISING
The "controversial issues" 6 aspect of the fairness doctrine crystal-
lized in the 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees.
7
4 See notes 49-58 and accompanying text infra.
The distinction between transportation by private passenger automobile and pro.
pulsion by internal combustion must be underscored. Although the former is objection-
able to many critics for the cultural and aesthetic changes it has forced, the life style ac-
commodations it has demanded, and the high incidence of accidents it has provoked,
inherently it poses no direct threat to public health. That private automobiles should
continue as the preeminent American mode of transportation is the implicit premise of
those who are working to develop a nonpolluting engine. Note 79 infra. The deleterious
effects of the internal combustion propulsion system are the sole focus of this note.
The term "automobile" is occasionally used here as a convenient shorthand for its
powerplant.
5 See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
6 The "controversial issues" aspect of the fairness doctrine must be distinguished
from the "equal opportunities" and "personal attack" doctrines. The "equal opportuni-
ties" or "equal time" requirement specifies that if a broadcaster furnishes broadcast time
to one candidate for political office, he must furnish an equal broadcast opportunity at
an equivalent charge to other candidates. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-52, 315 (1964). The rules
governing personal attack constitute the other facet of the fairness doctrine. A broad-
caster who attacks the integrity or character of a specific person or group must promptly
notify the person or group attacked, supply a transcript, tape, or other record of the
substance of the attack, and offer broadcast time to respond. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, .300,
.598 (1971). Congress has implicitly approved the fairness doctrine. 47 U.S.C. § 315(4) (1964).
7 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Report]. This report remains the key
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Briefly stated, the doctrine requires broadcasters to seek out and
broadcast responsible contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues of
public importance. The broadcast licensee decides in good faith
whether one side of an issue has been presented, and the format,
spokesman, time, and proper viewpoint for a reply.8 If paid sponsor-
ship cannot be obtained, the reply time must be furnished gratui-
tously.9
The purpose of the fairness doctrine is to ensure that all sides of
an issue are heard, that no licensee broadcasts solely those shades of
opinion that he himself endorses. Under fairness, America's electronic
media are expected to reflect adequately her intellectual and political
pluralism. The doctrine has been seen as an affirmative extension of
the first amendment: not only is government prohibited from restrict-
ing individual speech, but, on radio and television at least, it also has
the affirmative duty to safeguard the "marketplace of ideas" concept
which lies at the heart of the first amendment. 10 Speaking for the
document delineating broadcasters' fairness duties, although it was supplemented in 1964
by the so-called Fairness Primer. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of
Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 53:24 (1964) [herein-
after cited as Fairness Primer]. See also HousE COMM. ON INTEsrAE AND FOREIGN CoM-
MERGE, LEGiSLATIVE HISToRY OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE, H.R. Doc. No. 742, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968).
The original justification for the creation and authority of the FCC was the scarcity
of broadcast frequencies and the need to allocate spectrum space. The Commission was
authorized to license and regulate broadcasters in light of the "public convenience,
interest, or necessity." 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a), (b) (1964). The Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) nominally em-
braced the "scarcity" rationale as the authority for the FCC's fairness regulations but
hinted at a new "access" rationale based on the first amendment. See note 10 and ac-
companying text infra. Thus, even the total development of ultra high frequency broad-
casting, with all the implications that would have for the "scarcity" rationale, would not
disturb a fairness doctrine based on a right of access.
8 Report 1250-51. The broadcaster thus has substantial discretion in deciding how
to meet his fairness obligations. See Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial
Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970); Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971); Fairness Primer 1913.
9 Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969).
10 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See Notice of Inquiry, 30
F.C.C.2d 26 (1971); Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media? 48 TEXAS L REv.
766, 769-70 (1970); Note, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Regula-
tions: A First Step Towards Creation of a Right of Access to the Mass Media, 54 CORNELL
L. REv. 294, 302-05 (1969). A former FCC Commissioner has argued that broadcast licensees
are fiduciaries for the public. Loevinger, Free Speech, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in
Broadcasting, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 278 (1969). See also Barrow, The Equal Oppor-
tunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars in the Forum of Democracy, 37
U. CIN. L. REv. 477 (1968); Kelly, Second Edition-Who Owns the Air?, CENtrER MAGAZINE,
March-April 1970, at 27; Note, The FCC Fairness Doctrine and Informed Social Choice,
8 HARV. J. LEGis. 333 (1971); Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of
Ideas, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1222 (1970).
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Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC," Justice White
said:
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount.... It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas...
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market.., by
... a private licensee .... [T]he right of the public to receive suit-
able access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas...
is crucial here.12
Although it was always understood that controversial issues might
arise in a variety of situations and broadcast presentations, 13 it was
never expressly stated that they might arise in the context of a product
advertisement.'4 But in 1966 a New York attorney, John F. Banzhaf III,
urged precisely that conclusion upon the Commission. Banzhaf argued
that "cigarette advertisements . . . deliberately seek to create the im-
pression and present the point of view that smoking is socially acceptable
and desirable, manly, and a necessary part of a full rich life."' 5 Because
of this implicit message, Banzhaf contended, licensee stations that
broadcast cigarette advertising have an affirmative obligation under
fairness to "endeavor to make [their] . . . facilities available for the
expression of contrasting viewpoints held by responsible elements."'1
To the surprise of the broadcast and tobacco industries, the FCC
agreed. In a terse, three-page opinion letter,17 the Commission ruled
that fairness was applicable to cigarette advertisements, since the
normal use of this product can be a hazard to the health of mil-
lions of persons. [Cigarette advertisements] clearly promote the use
of a particular cigarette as attractive and enjoyable. Indeed, they
understandably have no other purpose. We believe that a station
which presents such advertisements has the duty of informing its
audience of the other side of this controversial issue of public
11 395 US. 867 (1969) (upholding the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine).
12 Id. at 890. Cf. Barron, supra note 10, at 767.
13 Report 1250. For an enumeration of many of the varied contexts in which contro-
versial issues have arisen thus bringing fairness into play, see 53 IoWA L. R.. 480, 485-86
(1967).
14 Leventhal, supra note 1, at 98-105, argues that fairness was never intended to
apply to product advertising.
'5 Letter from John F. Banzhaf IMI to Television Station WCBS-TV, Dec. 1, 1966,
quoted in Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
16 405 F.2d at 1086.
17 Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 881 (1967). This ruling was later supple.
mented by a longer memorandum opinion and order in which the Commissioners detailed
the broadcasters' new duties and responded to many opposition arguments. Television
Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967).
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importance-that, however enjoyable, such smoking may be a
hazard to the smoker's health.18
The Commission stressed that although equal time was not required, a
"significant" amount of time must be devoted to the expression of the
antismoking viewpoint. 9 By being this specific, both as to the amount
of reply time and as to the nature of the controversial issue, the Com-
mission removed much of the discretion usually allowed a broadcaster
in this area.20
On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, the Commission's
ruling was upheld.2' Judge Bazelon found justification for the Com-
mission's ruling in its statutory duty to regulate broadcasting in the
public interest 22 rather than in the fairness doctrine per se.23 The
court did note, however, that the authority to regulate broadcasting
with only the public interest as a guide carried with it the danger of
censorship.24 For that reason the court narrowed the controlling regula-
tory standard to that of "public health," reasoning that this standard
was indisputably a major part of the public interest yet specific enough
to be constitutionally unobjectionable.25
The true significance of the FCC approach sanctioned in Banzhaf
will become clear only if it is used as a precedent for imposing
fairness obligations on other product advertising. The Banzhaf decision
did not immediately drive cigarette advertising from the airwaves.2 0
However, its significance as a protracted regulation of commercial ad-
18 Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, 382 (1967).
19 Id.
20 See note 8 and accompanying text supra. The Commission in addition strongly
suggested specific reply spokesmen. 8 F.C.C.2d at 882. This particularity gave rise to the
charge that the FCC had substituted its "fiat" for the usual licensee judgment, See
Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 940-42 (1967).
21 Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Banzhaf also appealed, arguing for
equivalent, not merely "substantial," reply time.
22 Id. at 1091-99.
23 The Supreme Court was at this time still considering the constitutionality of the
fairness doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 895 U.S. 367 (1969), a case on
appeal from the District of Columbia Circuit.
24 405 F.2d at 1095-96.
25 Id. at 1096-99. Having narrowed the standard, the court concluded that the Com-
mission had acted within it. 405 F.2d at 1099. See text accompanying notes 4142 infra.
28 There is some question as to whether the Banzhaf ruling or the federal package
labeling requirements (15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1970)) have actually reduced smoking.
Although in the last 10 years there has been a 17% reduction in the number of adult men
who smoke, in the last two years alone smokers between 12 and 18 years of age have In-
creased by one million. TIME, March 22, 1971, at 73-74. The fairness doctrine, however, was
not intended to dictate social choices, but only to see that they are informed. It may
have achieved its purpose even though the public response is not dramatic.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
vertising was obscured when Congress completely banned radio and
television cigarette advertising.
27
II
FAIRNESS AND AUTOMOBILE ADVERTISING
Friends of the Earth (FOE), an environmental action organiza-
tion, asked the FCC in March 1970 to rule that automobile and oil
company28 advertising implicitly presents one side of the controversial
public issue of the benefits and detriments of automobile use, and that
the fairness doctrine requires reply time.29 FOE argued that automobile
and oil company advertisments imply that automobiles are consonant
with an unpolluted environment and that automobile use is a requi-
site of the "full rich life."30 It maintained that under Banzhaf and in
light of the FCC's duty to regulate broadcasting in the public interest,
antipollution forces should be allowed to utilize television and radio
to inform the public of the health hazards inherent in the normal use
of automobiles.
The Commissioners rejected FOE's argument, stating that it was
not in the public interest to burden or restrict automobile or oil
company advertisements.31 Cigarettes, they said, were "unique," and
therefore fairness was inapplicable to other product advertising.3 2 That
"cigarettes are unique" needs little verification, but the Commission-
ers elaborated on this conclusion by delineating specific ways in which
cigarettes differed from automobiles. 33 The weakness of these distinc-
27 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
28 Although their specific contributions to air pollution may differ, both the in-
ternal combustion engine and its fuel are ultimately joint causes of pollutant emissions.
Letter from Jerome Kretchmer, Administrator of New York City Environmental Protection
Administration, to Dean Burch, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, June
20, 1970 (on file at the Cornell Law Review). Thus no distinction is drawn here between
oil company and automobile manufacturer advertising.
29 Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970), remanded, No. 24,556 (D.C. Cir., Aug.
16, 1971). FOE's formulation of the controversial issue was exceedingly narrow. It argued
that the question was whether small-displacement engines and non-leaded gasoline should
be used by the public until nonpolluting transportation is developed. 24 F.C.C.2d at 744.
See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
30 24 F.C.C.2d at 744. FOE here borrowed the language Banzhaf had used in his
successful cigarette campaign. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). FOE used as an example advertising which showed an
automobile on a white beach.
31 24 F.C.C.2d at 749.
32 Id. at 748.
33 Id. at 746-47. First the Commission contended that "[c]igarette smoking does not
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tions34 suggests the Commission's more fundamental fear that if fair-
ness were applied to automobiles, it would have to be applied to the
advertising for a host of other ecologically injurious products. 38 The
result, in the Commissioners' view, would be a serious undermining of
the commercially supported broadcasting system.86
On appeal this express concern for the stability of public broad-
casting was not fully explored .37 Although the District of Columbia
Circuit did not enthusiastically reaffirm Banzhaf, it found Banzhaf
and FOE indistinguishable.38 Automobile and oil company advertis-
ing, the court said, did in fact present one side of a controversial issue
of public importance,39 and therefore the FCC had erred in holding
the fairness doctrine inapplicable. The court remanded the case to
the Commission for a finding as to whether the licensee station had
involve a balancing of competing interests .... The benefits and detriments [involved
in the use of ecologically harmful products] are of a more complex nature, and do not
permit the simplistic approach taken as to cigarettes." Id. at 746. The Commission, how-
ever, must consider competing interests in any decision to impose obligations on
broadcasters. Indeed, competing interests were involved in the cigarette decision. Manu-
facture, sale, and service of automobiles is a major American industry, and a step which
would adversely affect Detroit's promotional campaigns is not to be taken without
caution. It remains, however, within the FCC's competence to balance automotive pro-
motional interests against the interest of national health. The scales tip in the latter's
favor. See notes 49-58 and accompanying text infra.
The Commission then stated that it would have barred cigarette advertising alto-
gether had that not been forbidden by federal law. But no one, it said, "proposes to
stop promoting or using the fruits of the technological revolution." 24 F.C.C.2d at 746.
This argument is fallacious because: (1) it falsely equates cigarette advertising and
automobile use (id. at 754 (dissenting opinion)); (2) it is circular; and (3) it is simply
inaccurate (see note 79 infra).
Third, the FCC admitted that government ecological action is needed, but con-
tended that such action should be direct and not focus on the "peripheral advertising
aspect." 24 F.C.C.2d at 746. The reliance broadcasters and industry place on the power
of television advertising belies the suggestion that it is of "peripheral" importance. In
addition, the Commission was not perceptibly moved by this consideration in the cigarette
ruling. Direct legislative action preceded the Banzhaf decision. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39
(1970).,
34 Note 33 supra.
35 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
36 Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 748-49 (1970). See also Notice of Inquiry,
30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971).
37 The matter was noted briefly. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, No. 24,556 (D.C. Cir.,
Aug. 16, 1971).
38 We do not ...minimize either the seriousness or the thorny nature of the
problems .... Pending, however, a reformulation of its position, we are unable to
see how the Commission can plausibly differentiate the case presently before us
from Banzhaf insofar as the applicability of the fairness doctrine is concerned.
Id.
39 The court accepted the narrow formulation of the controversial issue involved.
Text accompanying note 29 supra.
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discharged its fairness obligations, 40 and if it had not, what other
positive actions must be taken to achieve programming balance.
The District of Columbia Circuit's failure to consider fully the
Commission's concern for commercial broadcasting is unfortunate.
Burdensome or unwarranted restrictions upon advertising might seri-
ously harm the broadcast industry, but it does not follow that restric-
tions are never warranted. The Commission seems to be acting under
the assumption that no limits can or will be imposed in the advertising
area and that therefore fairness cannot be manageably extended. This
is simply not true. The Banzhaf decision provides explicit and implicit
limits that can serve as guidelines to distinguish those products which
are proper subjects for advertising regulation in the public interest.
Only if a product exceeds the guideline limits should the broadcaster
who advertises it be impressed with fairness reply obligations. Since
automobile and oil company advertising by far surpasses these guide-
lines, ecological reply time is therefore in the public interest.
A. Type of Danger Posed by the Product Advertised
While upholding the FCC's general authority to regulate broad-
casting in the public interest, the Banzhaf court cautiously based its
approval of the Commission's regulation of cigarette advertising on the
narrowed "public health" standard:41 "with First Amendment issues
lurking in the near background, the 'public interest' is too vague a
criterion for administrative action unless it is narrowed by definable
standards." 42 Under Banzhaf, therefore, requests for advertisement re-
ply time based on political, social, or moral opposition to the product
advertised are not to be sustained.
48
Automobile use and cigarette smoking both undeniably endanger
public health. The same may be said, however, about many advertised
40 Since the Commission's original decision in Friends of the Earth was based solely
on the inapplicability of the fairness doctrine, the Commission never ruled on the
defendant station's allegation that even were fairness applicable it had satisfied its
fairness obligations through its regular programming.
41 Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1096-97 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 US. 842
(1969). The public health standard was preferable because "[t]here is perhaps a broader...
consensus on that value... than on any other likely component of the public interest." Id.
42 Id. at 1096 (footnote omitted).
48 But see Retail Store Employees Union, Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir.
1970), where the same court held that the FCC should have considered in more than
summary fashion, a striking union's fairness challenge to a broadcast license renewal.
The union charged that the station, without referring to the strike, had broadcast the
retailer's advertisements while refusing to broadcast union messages urging people not
to cross the picket lines.
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products, such as alcoholic beverages and high cholesterol foods." The
"public health" standard, therefore, is itself insufficient to rebut the
parade of horribles. Additional standards are necessary.
B. Extent and Provability of the Harm Resulting from Use of the
Advertised Product
Injuries from cigarette smoking, according to the Banzhaf court,
were substantial and fully documented by "overwhelming scientific
evidence, by the findings of Government agencies, and by Congres-
sional reports and statute." 45 Advertisements for products posing only
conjectural, unproven, or insubstantial threats-even to the public
health-should therefore not be burdened with reply duties. Environ-
mental injuries resulting from automobile use, however, are unfortu-
nately far from conjectural. They are evidenced by an impressive vol-
ume of governmental46 and private47 documents. In several respects
automobile use constitutes a greater public health hazard than cigarette
use ever did.
48
Automobiles are responsible for from sixty percent to eighty
44 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
45 405 F.2d at 1098, quoting Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 952-53
(1967) (concurring opinion). "[Cigarette smoking] is . . .a danger to life itself . .. [and]
threatens a substantial body of the population, not merely a peculiarly susceptible fringe
group." 405 F.2d at 1097.
46 E.g., M. KORTH, EFFErs OF THE RATIO OF HYDROCARBONS TO OXIDES OF NITROGEN
IN IRRADIATED AUTO EXHAUsT (HEW 1966); SURGEON GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
MOTOR VEHICLES, AIR POLLUTION, AN HEALTH, H.R. Doc. No. 489, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962); PA. GEN. AssY PANEL OF TECHNICAL ADvIsoRs ON AUToMorsV AIR POLLUTION, RE-
PORT TO THE JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT CoMMITTEE (1963); S. REP. No. 745, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970); H.R. REP. No. 899, 89th Cong., ist Sess. (1965). The Council on Environmental
Quality in its 1970 report devoted substantial attention to the problem of vehicle exhaust
emissions. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON EN-
VIRONMENTAL QUALITY 62-71, 76-89 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY].
There has also, of course, been legislative action on the problem of air pollution and
exhaust emissions. See Air Quality Act of 1967 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970); Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1970)); Mulford-Carrell
Air Resources Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39000-39570 (West Supp. 1971). See Com-
ment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: .Better Automotive Ideas from Congress, 12 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 571 (1971).
47 E.g., J. EsPosITo, VANISING Am 26-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as VANIsHING Am];
Note, Air Pollution Generated by Internal Combustion Engines, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 280
(1971); Comment, Air Pollution: The Problem of Motor Vehicle Emissions, 3 CONN. L.
REV. 178 (1970); Note, Air Pollution: Causes, Sources and Abatement, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q.
205, 214-15, 225-27 (1968). See generally NATIONAL TUBERCULOsIs AND RESPIRATORY DISEASE
ASS'N, AIR POLLUTION PRIMER (1969); Cassell, The Health Effects of Air Pollution and
Their Implications for Control, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1968).
48 See Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678, 685-96
(1966). Compare the health hazards enumerated there as resulting from cigarette smoking
with the hazards outlined in notes 49-58 and accompanying text infra.
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percent of America's air pollution.49 Each year automobile exhaust
systems dump 180 billion pounds of pollutants into the atmosphere.50
These emissions contain a murderous arsenal of poisons: 51
(1) Carbon monoxide is a colorless, odorless gas, a by-product of
incomplete combustion. It displaces oxygen in the blood stream and
aggravates pre-existing anemia, heart and blood diseases, chronic lung
disorders, and overactive thyroid conditions. Internal combustion
vehicles in the United States emit sixty-three million tons52 of carbon
monoxide into the air each year.
(2) Sulfur oxides are corrosive gases released when sulfur-containing
fuel is not completely ignited. Stationary sources produce the great
preponderance of such gases, but automobiles emit almost a million
tons a year. Sulfur oxides harm the respiratory tract and delicate lung
tissue.
(3) Particulates are minute solid and liquid substances released
into and suspended in the atmosphere. Particulates of asbestos, a
virtually indestructible material commonly found in brake linings and
dutch facings, have in recent years been discovered in the ambient air
in increasing quantities. Asbestos particles can lodge in the lungs and
complicate pre-existing conditions, and may also cause asbestosis.
Tetraethyl lead, a common gasoline additive which improves the
combustion process, is another primary source of particulate pollution.
(4) Hydrocarbons, unlike carbon monoxide, are nontoxic by-
products of incomplete combustion. They constitute a major com-
ponent, however, of the photochemical "smog" which plagues large
cities. More than half of the thirty-two million tons of hydrocarbons
emitted annually into the air is produced by transportation vehicles.
49 S. REP. No. 745, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970); see VANISHING AIR 28.
50 VANISHING AIR 28.
For each 1,000 gallons of gasoline consumed there is emitted:
3,200 lbs. carbon monoxide
200-400 lbs. organic vapors
20-75 lbs. oxides of nitrogen
18 lbs. aldehydes
17 lbs. sulphur compounds
2 lbs. organic acids
2 lbs. ammonia
.3 lbs. solids.
R. RIENOW & L. RIENOW, MOMENT IN THE SUN: A REPORT ON THE DETERIORATING QUALITY
OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT 113 (1967), quoting Middleton & Clarkson, Motor Vehicle
Pollution Control, 1961 TRAFFIc Q. 306-17.
51 See VANISHING Am 9-19; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 61-91; S. REP. No. 745, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 3-4 (1970); Note, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q., supra note 47, at 206-11.
52 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 63. The subsequent list of weights in the text draws upon
this source as well.
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(5) Nitrogen oxides combine with hydrocarbons to form ozone,
nitrogen dioxide, peroxyacyl nitrates, aldehydes, and acrolein. These
chemicals are further ingredients of smog, which causes eye and lung
irritation, low visibility, and aesthetic decay in metropolitan areas.
Transportation vehicles emit eight million tons of nitrogen oxides each
year.
The chemicals enumerated above have been shown to contribute
to the incidence of emphysema (the nation's fastest growing cause of
death"8), bronchitis, asthma, allergies, genetic mutations,5 4 cancer, heart
disease, and even common viruses.5 5 There have, in addition, been air
pollution "disasters" in which weather inversions 6 contributed to the
deaths of extraordinary numbers of people.57 The dangers involved in
cigarette smoking pale by comparison. Indeed, one commentary notes
that a New York City pedestrian inhales the equivalent in toxic materi-
als of almost two packs of cigarettes each day.
58
These facts emphasize that the automobile, as distinguished from
other products whose dangers have been less well substantiated, is a
proven and substantial health hazard-indeed, one of the country's
greatest health problems.59
C. The Inevitability of Injury
.Banzhaf stressed that it was the "normal use" of cigarettes, not their
abuse, which produced the hazard to health.60 When injury results
solely from the purchaser's abuse of the product, of course, there may
53 VANISHING AIR 16-17.
54 Id. at 10-12.
55 Id. at 10.
50 That is, polluted air that does not rise and dissipate.
57 In 1948 such an inversion occurred in the mining community of Donora, Pennsyl-
vania. Almost half of the town's 16,000 inhabitants fell ill, and 17 died, a number far
above ordinary. In 1952 a "killer smog" in London lasted several days and resulted in
4,000 deaths. See H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
58 R. RiENow & L. RIENOW, supra note 50, at 111.
Injuries to individual health are not the only "costs" of air pollution and auto-
mobile use. Americans spend $800 million each year cleaning fabrics soiled by air pollu-
tion. Damage to crops and livestock totals $500 million. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY 72.
There are also social and psychological costs. Los Angeles school children are forbidden
to play outside on "smog alert" days. Visitors to the United States are frequently im-
pressed by our soot. These things too are real "costs" of air pollution even though they
cannot be measured in dollars. Indeed, to do so might debase "the very values one is trying
to preserve." VANISHING AIR 20.
59 "Air is our most vital resource, and its pollution is our most serious environmental
problem." Presidential Message on the Environment, 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 160,
164 (Feb. 10, 1970).
00 Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1097 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). See
Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 943 (1967).
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be less reason to restrict that product or to regulate its advertising.
Automobile accidents resulting in harm61 and the damage from some
advertised products, including aesthetic injury from discarded product
containers, might similarly be considered to be caused by purchaser
abuse. It is dear, however, that automotive air pollution is an inevitable
by-product of normal driving and the normal combustion process.
62
Harm to the atmosphere is consequently inevitable whenever a person
drives. And harm to the individual is likewise unavoidable since an
individual has no choice in the matter of breathing.
63
III
THE ELEGTRONIC MEDIA AND ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS
The Banzhaf guidelines provide a framework for manageable ex-
tensions of fairness to product advertising. Since automobiles dearly
exceed the guidelines, a parade of horribles would not inevitably
result if clean air groups were granted automobile advertising reply
time. But it is not enough merely to show that extending fairness to
automobile advertising is manageable and legally supportable: the
extension must also be soundly rooted in public policy.64
Unquestionably, air pollution is a national health problem of
major magnitude and automobiles are the primary source of pollutants.
Equally obvious is radio and television advertising's promotion of the
purchase and use of automobiles, and implication that motorists enjoy
a healthy, full, rich life style.65 No mention is made that automobiles
61 That automobile accidents are caused exclusively by driver abuse is a debatable
proposition. See generally R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DEsiGNED-IN DANGERS
OF THE AMERicAN AuToMOBILE (1965); Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for
Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HARv. L. REV. 863 (1956); Nader, Automobile Design:
Evidence Catching Up With the Law, 42 DENvER L. CENTER J. 32 (1965); Note, Automobile
Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and Its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 299
(1969).
62 See note 79 infra.
63 See Mander, The Media and Environmental Awareness, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL
HANDBOOK 253, 258 (G. DeBell ed. 1970).
64 See notes 6-9 and accompanying text supra.
65 All automobile and oil company advertising implicitly promotes the sale and use
of automobiles, and this fact in itself is sufficient to require reply time. Cf. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 225-26 (1970). Some advertisements, however, take express
note of the environmental problem and by doing so present directly, rather than im-
plicitly, one side of the issue. For example, General Motors has produced an advertise-
ment, promoting no particular automobile model, in which a spokesman explains GM's
catalytic exhaust mechanism. The closing line is, "GM made you a promise to get the car
out of the pollution problem, and General Motors is doing it." Compare the complaints
of industry spokesmen that automobile manufacturers cannot possibly meet 1975 federal
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are contributing to the destruction of the very atmosphere necessary
to life. The implications of this destruction at least require public
exposure. Among them is the sobering thought that the internal com-
bustion engine and America's national health may be in irreconcilable
conflict.66
One of the greatest problems faced by environmentalists is edu-
cating Americans to embrace new attitudes, to change their life
styles to conform to the "new comprehension" of things.67 Environ-
mental education has been proclaimed as a national goal by both the
Council on Environmental Quality68 and the Congress.69 More and
more it is being realized that Americans "as a society, can no longer
pollution standards. E.g., TIME, May 17, 1971, at 46. A Texaco advertisement implies that
walking is the only environmentally "clean" alternative to driving and that the rational
response to pollution problems is to improve gasoline. But walking is not the only form
of nonpolluting transportation and there is evidence that there is no such thing as a
nonpolluting gasoline. See note 79 and accompanying text infra. Such advertising gives
the impression that industry is solving a problem which in fact may be insoluble without
a transportation revolution. Note 79 infra. See Turner, Ecopornography or How To Spot an
Ecological Phony, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 263.
Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones of the Federal Trade Commission has urged
advertisers to adopt "socially oriented" sales messages, to associate product use with a
better country rather than with personal success or status. Jones, The Cultural and Social
Impact of Advertising on American Society, 1970 LAw AD SocIAL ORm 379, 394-95.
Contemporary television commercials largely depict life at its most superficial level, with
protagonists seemingly concerned only with the unceasing pursuit of luxuries. Jones's sug-
gestion to channel advertising towards social rather than personal goals is therefore well
motivated. But the suggestion carries a serious potential for deceit.
A good illustration is Chevron's "bag" advertisement, featuring former astronaut
Scott Carpenter. A huge plastic bag is shown attached to the exhaust pipe of a car which
is idling on "brand X" gasoline. The air in the bag is black; Carpenter terms it "dirty
exhaust." After six tankfuls of Chevron's product are used, the bag is transparent.
Carpenter pronounces the exhaust "clean." Such advertising, although "socially oriented,"
seems clearly misleading. The "clean" exhaust still contains invisible hydrocarbons, carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and lead particulates.
The Federal Trade Commission has moved to halt this Chevron advertisement. 1 BNA
ENVIRON~MENT RE,.-CuRENT DEvELoPMENTs 586 (Oct. 2, 1970). It has also announced
that it will monitor ecology-oriented advertising for deception. Washington Post, May 31,
1971, § D, at 7, col. 7.
The FCC has stated that fairness will apply to product advertisements that deal
directly with controversial issues of public importance, such as ecological balance. Notice
of Inquiry, 80 F.C.C.2d 26, 31 n.5 (1971). It has already applied the doctrine to one environ-
mental advertisement, that of Standard Oil of New Jersey concerning the company's
Alaska oil drilling operations. National Broadcasting Co., 40 U.S.L.W. 2047 (F.C.C. June
30, 1971).
66 See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
67 See Cantor, Warning: The Automobile Is Dangerous to Earth, Air, Fire, Water,
Mind and Body, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 197, 210.
68 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITy 221-22.
69 E.g., Environmental Education Act § 2, 20 U.S.C. § 1531 (1970); S. R P. No.
1164, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). See also note 77 and accompanying text infra.
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afford the luxury of not knowing the environmental consequences of
. . . decisions." 70 Granting time to environmentalists to reply to
automobile advertising is merely recognizing the American people's
right to be fully informed and to make environmentally conscious
choices. Considering the magnitude of the problem of environmental
decay, environmental awareness should be developed and nurtured in
all possible ways.
The critical role the electronic media-especially television-
could play in promoting environmental awareness cannot be under-
stated. Television is a primary influence on beliefs and attitudes in
America.71 It is "the prime [instrument] for the management of con-
sumer demand,"72 one which "provides ... a relentless propaganda on
behalf of goods in general. From early morning until late at night,
people are informed" that various goods are "the source of health,
happiness, social achievement, or improved community standing." 73
The impact of television, in fact, cannot be equaled by any other com-
munications medium.
74
It is a force of this magnitude that Detroit marshals every time it
buys network time to promote its products. Fairness, even in its every-
day meaning, requires that television allow the other side substantial
opportunity to rebut the implicit and powerful advertising message
that automobiles are consonant with the national health. The public
interest could only be served by a clear FCC ruling to this effect.
"Americans are being grossly oversold an automotive product and
life-style they neither need nor may really want, and which may eventu-
ally kill them with its exhaust by-products." 75 Television's awesome
70 S. REP. No. 1164, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1970).
71 Ninety-five percent of American homes have a television which is operating an
average of almost six hours a day. N. JOHNSON, How TO TALK BACK TO YOUR T.LEVISION
SET 11 (1970). See Jones, supra note 65, at 383. Because of the passive nature of watching
television and the repetitious nature of advertising messages, television exercises a potent
force in changing or developing, in a subliminal way, viewer perceptions. See Retail Store
Employees Union, Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248, 257 n.61 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Krugman,
The Impact of Television Advertising: Learning Without Involvement, 29 PUB. Op. Q.
349 (1965); Zielske, The Remembering and Forgetting of Advertising, 23 J. MARKETING
239 (1959).
72 J. GALBRAITH, THE Nmv INDUSTRIAL STATE 208 (1967). The author also notes that
"[t]he industrial system is profoundly dependent on commercial television and could not
exist in its present form without it." Id.
73 Id. at 209.
74 "Television is one of the most powerful forces man has ever unleashed upon
himself. The quality of human life may depend enormously on our efforts to comprehend
and control that force." N. JOHNSON, supra note 71, at 3.
75 Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 752 (1970) (dissenting opinion), remanded,
No. 24,556 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 16, 1971).
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power to persuade and educate should be available to curb pollution,
not simply reserved for industrial advertisers whose products cause
the pollution. 76
CONCLUSION
President Nixon in a recent executive order directed federal
agencies to "initiate measures needed to direct their policies, plans and
programs so as to meet national environmental goals. '77 Elimination
of air pollution and promotion of environmental awareness and edu-
cation are indisputably national environmental goals of high priority.
Application of fairness to automobile advertising can only advance
these goals; any threat to commercial broadcasting posed by such an
application could be neutralized if the FCC embraced as guidelines
the standards implicit in Banzhaf.
Definition of the controversial issue is of critical importance.
Friends of the Earth asked whether low lead gasoline and small engine
cars might be preferred until nonpolluting transportation is de-
veloped.78 But broader issues than this are involved. Can America's
interest in the public health and its economic investment in the internal
combustion engine ever be reconciled? There is increasing evidence
that reconciliation is impossible, that Detroit's tack-on devices will not
solve the problem, and that alternate modes of transportation less
damaging to the environment must be developed.7 9 More broadly, it
76 Television's response to the ecology crisis has in many ways been encouraging.
It has broadcast some remarkably sensitive and informative documentaries and news
reports. See The Environment, the Consumer, and the Broadcaster, in SURvEY OF BROAD-
CAsT JouRNAusm 1969-70, YEAR OF CHALLENGE YEAR OF CRIsis 81 (M. Barrett ed. 1970).
Television owes a greater duty, however. The effect of a myriad of artfully aimed auto-
mobile "spots" can scarcely be countered by an occasional documentary. "[S]ince not all
of a station's audience is normally listening to broadcasts at any one time, repetition
increases the likelihood that a given message will be heard by any individual, and may
also increase its impact on those hearing the message more times than one." Retail Store
Employees Union, Local 880 v. FCC, 486 F.2d 248, 257 n.61 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The FCC's cigarette ruling, approved by the Banzhaf case, imposed spot reply burdens
despite a showing that the defendant television station had broadcast several news and
information programs on the health dangers of smoking. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082,
1086 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). In Banzhaf, Judge Bazelon noted that "[a]
man who hears a hundred 'yeses' for each 'no,' when the actual odds lie heavily the other
way, cannot be realistically deemed adequately informed." Id. at 1099.
77 ExEc. ORDER No. 11514, 3 C.F.R. 531 (1971 Comp.).
78 Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 744 (1970). This formulation of the issue
was adopted by the court of appeals. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, No. 24,556 (D.C. Cir.,
Aug. 16, 1971). See note 29 supra.
79 Internal combustion is an inherently wasteful way of generating energy. Harmful
by-products seem to be inevitable. For example, an automobile has to be almost perfectly
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must be asked whether America, in the name of national health and
ecological survival, can overcome in a crucial area the psychological
inertia of its citizens, the opposition of vested industrial interests, and
a heritage of mindless consumption and commercialism. The Com-
mission should not-and could not with right-define the issue this
broadly. But the effort to inform Americans of the injurious environ-
mental effects of automobile use is only part of a larger struggle towards
a new ethic of ecological harmony. This struggle is one of the most
important Americans will ever make. The Federal Communications
Commission, through unwarranted fear of unmanageable consequen-
ces, or merely from timidity, should not refuse to pick up the guidon.
John L. Zenor
tuned for an emission control device to function properly. For this reason most devices
are ineffective. In addition, some by-products, notably nitrogen oxides, cannot be pre-
vented by any known emission controls. The inevitability of emission pollutants resulting
from the internal combustion process has led many responsible persons to conclude that
it should be abolished as a method of propulsion. See Lessing, The Revolt Against the
Internal-Combustion Engine, FORTUNE, July 1967, at 81-84. Two states, Hawaii and
California, have considered legislation to ban the internal combustion engine entirely.
See VANISHING Am 30; Comment, supra note 47, at 195. The President, Congress, the De-
partment of Transportation, and the Council on Environmental Quality have at least
contemplated the possibility. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857b-l(a)(2), -6e (1970); ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 89; SENATE COMMERCE COMM., THE SEARCH FOR A Low EMISSION VEHICLE (1962);
S. RE'. No. 745, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
51-53 (1970) (additional views of Representative L. Van Deerlin, Representative R. Ot-
tinger, and R. 0. Tiernan); Presidential Message on the Environment, 6 WEEKLY Comrp.
PREs. Docs. 160 (Feb. 10, 1970); 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS 491
(Sept. 4, 1970). Remarking upon the 1970 Clean Air Amendments, Senator Edmund Muskie
commented that "Detroit has told the Nation that Americans cannot live without the
automobile. This legislation would tell Detroit that if that is the case, they must make
an automobile with which Americans can live." 116 CONG. REC. S 16092 (daily ed.
Sept. 21, 1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
There are several proposed alternatives to propulsion by internal combustion in-
cluding gas turbines, Rankine cycle engines (steam), and electricity. All emit few pollutants,
but feasibility and efficiency problems remain. The German-developed Wankel engine,
which features a revolving triangular rotor in a combustion chamber instead of a piston,
has been touted as a low pollution powerplant although employing internal combustion.
See N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 18. The Japanese automobile industry is
now selling Wankel-powered automobiles in the United States. TIME, April 5, 1971, at 84.
Automobile manufacturers have not been aggressive in developing a nonpolluting
automobile. See United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 597 US. 248 (1970). Because
of their major investment in the internal combustion engine they have consistently
refused to admit the feasibility of alternative propulsion systems. VANISHING At 26-68.
As the problem of motor vehicle emissions continues to grow, however, such alternative
propulsion systems look increasingly necessary, and their implementation increasingly
possible. See 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CRREN DEVELOPMENTS 633, 661 (Oct. 16, 23,
1970).
